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Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in
Domestic Violence Law:
A Critical Review
Donna Coker*

The controversy about nation-wide implementation of
mandatory arrest policies reflects the ambivalence with
which feminists regard the police. On one hand, battered
women's advocates want to hold the police accountable, as
agents of the state, for carrying out the government's
mandate to protect citizens. On the other hand, feminists
realize that police often exercise their power in ways that
reinforce the disadvantages already experienced by women,
and in ways that reinforce the disadvantages experienced by
members of poor and minority communities as well.1
We must frame this crisis the following way: state power...
simultaneously empowers and disempowers women.2

* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.

Marc Fajer and Martha

Mahoney provided particularly helpful comments on a later draft of this essay, for
which I am very grateful. The comments of Peter Margulies, James Ptacek, and
Lynne Henderson on a related book chapter draft were very useful in helping me
formulate this article. I am also grateful for the comments and support of
Deborah Weissman, Jonathan Simon, Zanita Fenton, and the participants of the
conference, "Race, Class, Gender, and Ethnicity, Crime and Consequence: The
Impact of Criminalization" at the University of North Carolina School of Law
(March 2001). Special thanks to conference co-organizer Mary Lee Perry and the
other U.N.C. students whose intellectual vision and organizational skills are truly
impressive. Gregory McFarland and Stacey Bussel provided important research
assistance. Of course, any mistakes in this article are my responsibility.
1. Anne Sparks, Feminists Negotiate the Executive Branch: The Policing of
Male Violence, in Feminists Negotiate the State: The Politics of Domestic
Violence 35, 35-36 (Cynthia R. Daniels et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Feminists
Negotiate the State].
2. Laurie Naranch, Naming and Framing the Issues: Demanding Full
Citizenship for Women, in Feminists Negotiate the State, supra note 1, at 20, 33.
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INTRODUCTION

The last several years have seen an explosion of
domestic violence law reform. While significant changes
have occurred in civil law provisions, 4 much of the recent
law reform has focused on a number of far-reaching
changes in criminal law.'
This focus on criminal law
3. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women: Feminist
Lawmaking and the Struggle for Equality (2000) (describing feminist advocacy
and lawmaking from the 1960s to the present day that resulted in reforms in laws
and legal institutional responses to domestic violence).
4. For example, at least twenty-three states have now adopted child custody
provisions with some form of presumption against child custody to a parent who
commits domestic violence. See Ami S. Jaeger, A Review of the Year in Family
Law: Century Ends with Unresolved Issues, 33 Fain. L.Q. 908 (2000). Every state
has adopted special domestic violence protection order legislation. See Clare
Dalton & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and the Law 498 (2001).
5. A number of states and municipalities have adopted strong domestic
violence arrest and prosecution policies. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2
(Michie 1999) (stipulating that when a peace officer has probable cause to believe
that an act of domestic violence has been committed, the peace officer shall arrest
without a warrant any person that he has probable cause to believe has
committed an act of domestic violence); Wis. Stat. § 968.075(2) (1998) (mandating
that law enforcement personnel shall arrest and take a person into custody if the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed domestic
abuse and either has a reasonable belief that continued abuse is likely or there is
evidence of physical injury to the alleged victim). Some states have adopted
specific domestic violence criminal statutes with penalties that exceed those for
similar crimes against a non-intimate. See, e.g., Calif. Penal Code § 273.5 (2000)
(the crime of infliction of injury on a spouse, cohabitee, or parent of child is
committed whenever a person "willfully inflicts.., corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition" and is a felony, punishable by "imprisonment... for two,
three, or four years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of
up to six thousand dollars.. .. ").

States have also adopted enhanced penalties

when domestic violence commission is accompanied by certain aggravating factors
such as the presence of a child. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155 (18)(C) (Michie
1998) (committing a domestic violence felony "in the physical presence or hearing
of a child under 16 years of age who was, at the time of the offense, living within
the residence of the victim, the residence of the perpetrator, or the residence
where the crime involving domestic violence occurred" is an aggravating factor
and may result in a term of imprisonment greater than the presumptive term).
The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") passed in 1994 and the recently
enacted Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ("VAWA II"),
have significantly changed federal criminal law, regarding domestic violence. See
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S. C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.);
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
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reform is the result of a confluence of factors. First, many
advocates for battered women have urged a stronger
criminal response, in part as a corrective for the history of
profoundly inadequate and sometimes hostile response of
the criminal justice system to domestic violence cases.
Second, crime control politics makes criminal law a
particularly attractive area of law reform. Politicians who
oppose increased government spending on "social
programs" have been happy to spend fimds on "fighting
crime."7 Fighting crime has political appeal to legislators
22 U.S.C. § 7101. VAWA enacted the following domestic violence related federal
crimes: crossing a state line in violation of a restraining order (18 U.S.C. § 2262);
crossing a state line to injure, harass or intimidate an intimate partner (18 U.S.C.
§ 2261 (a)(1)); forcing or tricking an intimate partner to cross a state line and
intentionally committing injurious violence against the partner while doing so or
as a result (18 U.S.C. § 2261 (aX2)). In addition, federal law requires anyone
convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor as well as anyone against whom a
domestic violence restraining order has been issued to surrender all firearms and
refrain from obtaining firearms that have been "shipped or transported" in
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
In addition, VAWA included authorization for $120 million in funds for
state and Indian tribe efforts to promote arrest and prosecution in domestic
violence cases and $800 million for law enforcement training on domestic
violence. 108 Stat. at 190-15.
6. See Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and
Struggles of the Battered Women's Movement 158 (1982) (noting that at the
beginning of the movement, battered women complained that police refused to
come when they were called, or they would side with the batterer, and they
refused to arrest).
7. As one group of battered women's activists explains:
Women's organizations [against domestic violence] found a sympathetic ear
in many legislative halls throughout the country. With such divisive and
emotional issues as abortion, and economic issues such as pay equity, day
care and affirmative action, legislatures found a "women's issue" that
conservatives and liberals alike could agree upon: Beating women is wrong.
Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing
Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive
Relationships, 15 Hamline L. Rev. 115, 124 (1991); see also Dianne L. Martin,
Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform, 36
Osgoode Hall L.J. 151, 183 (1998):
A law and order agenda that increases surveillance and control of the
underclass and directs justice resources toward street crime (and away
from "crime in the suites"), while allying with apparently progressive
issues such as reducing crime against women and increasing rights for
crime victims has obvious public relations value.
Laureen Snider, Towards Safer Societies: Punishment, Masculinities and
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in part because it is one of the few concerns that reaches
across differences

in fractious American politics. 8 As

Jonathan Simon argues, citizen disillusionment with
government's ability to provide for other aspects of
communal life has strengthened this focus on crime
control.' The result, what Simon refers to as "governing
through crime," 10 is increasing reliance on surveillance,
control, punitive measures, and fear of crime to shape
social behavior."
Millions of dollars are now being spent on domestic
violence criminal interventions. 2 Battered women's
advocates spend much of their time monitoring police and
prosecutor response to battered women. 13 There is nothing
obvious or necessary about this allocation of dollars or
human capital. Poor women are more vulnerable to repeat
violence, 4 yet relatively few dollars are allocated for
measures that would render them less vulnerable such as
transportation, or education and job training.15 Without
Violence Against Women, 38 The Brit. J. of Criminology 1, 9 (1998) ('Though
oppositional [feminist] voices [against criminalizing policies] remained, calls for
greater punitiveness were more easily heard than others, and coercive polices
were eagerly adopted by governments seeking to legitimate agendas tightening
control over underclass populations.").
8. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in The Crime
Conundrum: Essays on Criminal Justice 171 (Lawrence Meir Friedman & George
Fisher eds., 1997).
9. Id.
10. See generally id.; Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: Criminal
Law and the Reshaping of American Government, 1973-1998 (forthcoming, 2001)
manuscript at ch. 6, on file with author).
11. Simon, supra note 8; see also Martin, supra note 7, at 173 ("fear [of crime]
is a growth industry").
12. See text, infra note 18 (describing federal funding authorized through
Violence Against Women Act I and I).
13. See infra pages 845-46 (describing the role of battered women's advocates
in monitoring police and prosecutors).
14. See infra note 70 (describing the research on the vulnerability of lowincome women to domestic violence); see also Donna Coker, Shifting Power for
Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1009 (2000) (arguing for evaluating whether or not to adopt
domestic violence laws, policies, or services by use of a material resources test
that measures the likelihood of increasing battered women's access to material
resources).
15. See Schneider, supra note 3, at 197. The failure ofpolicy discourse to "link
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legal representation, women are unable to benefit from
much of domestic violence law reform, yet women have no
legal right to a state subsidy for an attorney"6 and there are
too few free lawyers for the number of domestic violence
cases. 7 Without adequate resources, women are unable to
relocate and therefore, they are unable to escape the reach
of controlling, violent ex-partners. Yet few dollars are
18
allocated for emergency relocation and long-term housing.
Women who are escaping well-funded or well-connected
dangerous men need the equivalent of a witness-protection
program (regardless of whether or not they testify in a
criminal proceeding), but no such program exists.
Not only does a focus on crime control deflect attention
from other anti-domestic violence strategies, crime control
policies result in greater state control of women,
particularly poor women. Further, under policies that do
not allow victims to choose whether or not to arrest and
prosecute their abuser, battered women are unable to
leverage the potential of criminal prosecution in return for
agreements from the batterer.
In the remainder of this article I turn to the two most
[domestic] violence to larger issues of gender" is illustrated by her experience:
In 1995 I was at the White House for the program establishing October as
Domestic Violence Awareness Month, at the same time that welfare
'reform' legislation was being debated in Congress. The White House
domestic violence program emphasized criminalization reforms, but failed
even to mention a link between welfare and violence.
Id.
16. See In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53 (N.Y. 1975) (indigent wives in divorce
actions have no constitutional right to have county provide counsel or to
compensate counsel).
17. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Foreword: Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and
Professional Issues in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1713, 1720 (1999) ("the funding of legal assistance for those who
cannot afford it remains grossly inadequate to meet the need"); Peter Margulies,
Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty
Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1071,
1071 (1995) ("legal services programs have determined priorities through a
skewed triage system that neglects domestic violence issues").
18. Recent federal legislation attempts to address this problem. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 10401 et seq. (2000) (authorizing funds for housing, transportation, counseling,
child care services, case management, employment counseling, and other
assistance for persons who are fleeing a situation of domestic violence).
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controversial criminal justice reforms in domestic violence
cases: mandatory arrest'9 and no drop prosecution °
policies. Mandatory arrest policies require that police
arrest whenever there is probable cause to believe that a
crime of domestic violence has occurred, even if the victim

opposes arrest.21

No-drop prosecution policies generally

require that prosecutors proceed with a domestic violence
case, regardless of the desires of the victim. 22 I refer to
these policies collectively as mandatory policies.
These mandatory policies offer the battered women's
movement some control over state response by increasing
the likelihood that police and prosecutors will not reject
battering cases. 2' However, because these policies make
irrelevant battered women's preferences regarding arrest
19. Mandatory arrest policies require that police officers responding to
domestic violence calls arrest whenever there is probable cause to believe that a
crime of domestic violence has occurred. If there is probable cause, arrest should
occur even if the victim is opposed to arrest. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2
(Michie 1999) (stipulating that when a peace officer has probable cause to believe
that an act of domestic violence has been committed, the peace officer shall arrest
without a warrant any person that he has probable cause to believe has
committed an act of domestic violence). Pro-arrest policies enact a presumption
for arrest and require that whenever an officer fails to arrest on a domestic
violence call, she/he must explain in writing the reason for the decision not to
arrest. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.29(2)(b) (West 1997) ("If an arrest was not
made, an indication by the law enforcement officer, in writing must be made, of
the reasons why an arrest was not made.").
20. No-drop prosecution policies require that prosecutors refuse to drop
charges against a domestic assailant whenever there is evidence that a crime of
domestic violence took place, regardless of the victim's desires regarding
prosecution. Cheryl Hanna describes "soft" and "hard" no-drop policies. Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1863 (1996).
Soft no-drop policies
encourage victim cooperation with prosecution but do not resort to issuing
subpoenas to victims or charging them with contempt of court when they fail to
appear; some soft no-drop policies allow victims to drop charges if they first see a
counselor or present their reasons to a court. With hard no drop policies, the
prosecutor may subpoena victims as witnesses, pursue contempt charges if they
fail to appear, and not allow victims to drop charges under any circumstances. Id.
21. See supra note 5.
22. See supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its
Critics, in Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? 115, 127 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) ("The first reason for mandating arrest was to control
police behavior.").
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and prosecution,2 mandatory policies limit the control of
individual women. In addition, these policies operate in
ways that may further state control of women, particularly
women who are marginalized by race, class, immigrant
status, or those whom state actors-police, courts, child
protection workers-perceive to be "deviant."25 The
dilemma for feminists is to develop strategies for
controlling state actors-ensuring that the police come

when called and that prosecutors do not trivialize caseswithout increasing state control of women. It is the
dilemma
of making domestic violence a public
responsibility in the context of racist and classist public
systems.2 6
THE CONTEXT

In her keynote address at a conference entitled, The
Color of Violence: Violence Against Women of Color,"
Angela Davis provided the following challenge to feminist
work against domestic violence:
We need an analysis that furthers neither the conservative
project of sequestering millions of men of color in accordance
with the contemporary dictates of globalized capital and its
prison industrial complex, nor the equally conservative

24. See supra notes 19, 20 (mandatory policies do not allow victims to

determine whether or not arrest and prosecution takes place).
25. See infra section II at 821.
26. See Donna Coker, Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination Processes
in Cases of Domestic Violence, in Restorative Justice and Family Violence: New
Ideas and Learning from the Past (John Braithwaite & Heather Strang eds.,
forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 9, on file with author).
27. See Patricia Macias Rojas, Rebuilding the Anti-Violence Movement, 3
ColorLines (Fall 2000), available at www.arc.org/Clines.CLArchive/story
3303.html (describing the Color of Violence conference). The Color of Violence
conference was organized by Andrea Smith, a graduate student and battered
women's advocate. The conference, which took place at the University of
California Santa Cruz campus, brought together activists, scholars, and attorneys
from around the world to "strategize around the relationship among racism,
colonialism, and gender violence in the lives and histories of women of color." Web
posting
announcing
the
conference,
available
at
www.lmrinet.ucsb.edu/pipermail/reformanet/1999-September/004405.html.
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project of abandoning poor women of color to a continuum of
violence that extends from the sweatshops through the
prisons, to shelters, and into bedrooms at home. How do we
develop analyses and organizing strategies against violence
against women that acknowledge the race of gender and the
gender of race?'

Like Davis, a number of scholars have raised concerns
about the potential differential impact of mandatory

policies on women and men of color. 29 Arrest research
suggests that arrests in domestic violence cases involve
disproportionately high numbers of low-income men, 30
28. Angela Davis, Keynote Address to Color of Violence Conference, recorded
in Charles Brown, The Color of Violence Against Women (Oct. 25, 2000), available
at http://csf.colorado.edu/soc/m-fem/2000/msg01004.htm. Davis also questions
whether "a state that is infused with racism, male dominance, class-bias, and
homophobia, that constructs itself in and through violence, [can] act to minimize
violence in the lives of women of color." Id.
29. See Snider, supra note 7, at 9-10:
Anglo-American democracies over the 1970s and 80s revised law and
policies on sexual and domestic assault, increased sanctions and introduced
mandatory response, arrest and charging policies.... One result has been
intensified immiseration of lower class women, visible minorities, native
and aboriginal women. These are the women most vulnerable to contempt
of court charges and to counter-charging practices, and least able to resist
state action or find the resources to leave violent partners.
See generally Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males:
An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. Third
World L.J. 231, 245-46 (1994) (expressing concern about the effects of criminal
policies in Latino communities); Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary:
VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Last in the Intersections, 83 Marq.
L. Rev. 163 (1999) (mandatory arrest policies result in increased numbers of
arrests of non-citizen women who may then be rendered deportable under
immigration law); Coker, supra note 14, at 10 (mandatory arrest policies increase
vulnerability of poor women of color to state control); Barbara Fedders, Lobbying
for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the Battered
Women's Movement, XXIII Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 281 (1997) (the battered
women's movement has failed to account for the differential impact of
criminalizing policies on women of color).
30. See J. David Hirschel et al., The Failure of Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse,
29 J. Res. in Crime & Delinq. 7, 9 (1992) ("Non-White, lower income women
(under $7,500) are more than twice as likely to report an incident to the police
than are White, higher income (over $15,000) females"); see also Ronet Bachman
& Linda E. Saltzman, Nat'l Crime Victimization Survey, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Special Report NCJ-154348, Violence Against Women: Estimates from
the Redesigned Survey 4 (1995) (finding no statistically significant difference in
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African American men, and Latino men.3 1 Despite evidence
of disproportionate effects, little research has examined the
domestic violence rates between black and white women or between Hispanic and
non-Hispanic women, but finding that young women 19 to 29 years of age and
women with annual family incomes under $10,000 reported more domestic
violence); Callie Marie Rennison & Sarah Welchans, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Special Report NCJ-178247, Intimate Partner Violence 3 (2000) (reporting on the
National Crime Victimization Survey findings). For a discussion of the
importance of women's economic resources in their vulnerability to domestic
violence, see generally Coker, supra note 14.
31. See, e.g., JoAnn L. Miller & Amy C. Krull, Controlling Domestic Violence:
Victim Resources and Police Intervention, in Out of the Darkness: Contemporary
Perspectives on Family Violence 235, 239 (Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L.
Jasinaki eds., 1997) (assessment of data from three studies of domestic violence
arrest finds that Blacks and Hispanics (studies' terms) are over-represented in
the samples relative to their representation in the general population. In
Milwaukee, Blacks were over-represented by a factor of 10.6 and Hispanics by a
factor of 1.6; in Colorado Springs, Blacks were over-represented by a factor of 6.5
and Hispanics by 3.0; in Omaha, Blacks were over-represented by a factor of 9.3
and Hispanics by 1.9); see also, e.g., Richard A. Berk, What the Scientific
Evidence Shows: On the Average, We Can Do No Better Than Arrest in Current
Controversies on Family Violence 323, 331 (Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R.
Loseke eds., 1993) (43% of the victims and 55% of the suspects were "ethnic
minorities"); Michael Steinman, Coordinated Criminal Justice Interventions and
Recidivism Among Batterers, in Woman Battering: Policy Responses 221, 224
(Michael Steinman ed., 1991) (study of a county with 96% White, middle class
population, but 32% of domestic violence arrests before adoption of pro arrest
policy and 27% of those after the adoption of the policy were of people of color);
Ronet Bachman & Ann L. Coker, Police Involvement in Domestic Violence: The
Interactive Effects of Victim Injury, Offender's History of Violence, and Race, 10
Violence & Victims 91, 98 (1995) ("'ntraracial victimizations involving Black
victims and Black offenders were almost two times more likely to result in an
arrest compared to White-on-White victimizations") (emphasis added). But see
Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best
First Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 Crim. Just. 2 (1995) (comparison of
mandatory arrest rates of African Americans in Wisconsin found numbers smaller
than their representation in the population (arrest rates of 1.3% compared with
3.9% of population) and, while African Americans made up about 10% of the
domestic violence incident reports, they only accounted for 3.9% of the arrest
reports). In some urban areas, women of color likely make up the majority of
victim/complainants. See, e.g., Lisa Goodman et al., Obstacles to Victims'
Cooperation with the Criminal Prosecution of Their Abusers: The Role of Social
Support, 14 Violence & Victims 427, 436 (1999) (study consisting of female victim
complainants in domestic violence arrest cases in urban locale found that 90% of
the women in the study were African American women); Judith Wittner,
Reconceptualizing Agency in Domestic Violence Court, in Community Activisim &
Feminist Politics: Organizing Across Race, Class, and Gender 81, 87 (Nancy A.
Naples ed., 1998) (a high percentage of women seen in Chicago's domestic
violence court were women of color).
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impact of mandatory policies in low-income African
American and Latino communities.3 2 Federal funding is
earmarked for services for "underserved" battered women
including racial and ethnic minority women, 3 but few
federal research dollars are available to study the impact

on poor women

4 and women

of color of the criminal policies

encouraged by federal funding legislation.3 5 The negative
32. See, e.g., Judith McFarlane et al., Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Against
Pregnant Hispanic Women by Their Male Intimates, 7 Women's Health 739, 740
(1998) (quoting NIH Panel on Research on Antisocial, Aggressive, and ViolenceRelated Behaviors and Their Consequences as stating that: "An area of prime
concern is the paucity of information on Hispanic, Native American, African
American, and Asian involvement in aggressive and violent behavior, either as
victims or as agents.").
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 10402(a)(C) (2000) (requiring state recipients of Family
Violence Prevention funds to develop a plan "to address the needs of underserved
populations, including populations underserved because of ethnic, racial, cultural,
language diversity, or geographic isolation").
34. Much of domestic violence research fails to address the particular
circumstances of poor women or women of color. See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note
32; Susan B. Sorenson, Violence Against Women: Examining Ethnic Differences
and Commonalities, 20 Evaluation Rev. 123, 125 (1996) ("[Rlelatively little
empirical community-based research has investigated ethnic differences and
similarities in violence against women in U.S. sub-populations.
When
investigated, groups typically are collapsed into White vs. non-White or Black vs.
non-Black."). As Mary Ann Dutton writes:
Results of research including only Anglo American women cannot be
assumed to apply to women of color, women living in poverty, or women
whose native language is other than English. Research on battering and
its effects for disenfranchised women, such as the homeless, the seriously
and chronically mentally ill, define the life circumstances of these groups of
battered women.
Mary Ann Dutton, Battered Women's Strategic Response to Violence, in
Rethinking Violence Against Women 105, 118-19. (R. Emerson Dobash & Russell
P. Dobash eds., 1998).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(C)(1)(A) (2000) (eligibility for "grants to encourage
arrest policies" requires that the applicant unit of government certify that its
laws "encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based on
probable cause that an offense has been committed."). Federal funds are also
available for a limited number of states that qualify as "model" program states,
See 42 U.S.C. § 10415 (2000). To be designated as a model State, the state must
adopt the following:
(1) a law that requires mandatory arrest of a person that police have
probable cause to believe has committed an act of domestic violence or
probable cause to believe has violated an outstanding civil protection order;
(2) a law or policy that discourages "dual" arrests;
(3) statewide prosecution policies that (A) authorize and encourage
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effects of mandatory policies on some poor women, and
particularly on poor women of color, may be significant.36
This article examines domestic violence crime policy in
the context of intersecting oppressive systems of race, class,
and immigrant status. I have argued elsewhere that poor
women and particularly poor women of color should be the
focus for evaluating anti-domestic violence law and
policies.3 These women are "sandwiched by their
heightened vulnerability to battering, on the one hand, and
their heightened vulnerability to intrusive state control, on
the other."39 In essence, my argument is the reverse of the
"rising tide carries all boats": Law and policy that is based
on the experiences of poor women, and especially of poor
women of color, is likely to result in reforms that benefit all
battered women. But law and policy that is developed from
the experiences of a generic category "battered women," is
likely to reflect the needs and experiences of more
economically advantaged women and white women, and is

prosecutors to pursue cases where a criminal case can be proved, including
proceeding without the active involvement of the victim if necessary; and
(B) implement model projects that include either (i) a "no-drop" prosecution
policy; or (ii) a vertical prosecution policy;, and (C) limit diversion to
extraordinary cases, and then only after an admission before a judicial
officer has been entered.
42 U.S.C. § 10415 (bX1)-(3).
36. See section H, infra pages 821-41 (discussing the risks to poor women of
mandatory policies); see generally Espenoza, supra note 28 (describing the impact
of mandatory arrest policies on immigrant women).
37. I agree with Claire Renzetti who writes:
Women differ in many ways, including,... their races and ethnicities,
social classes, sexual orientations, ages, marital statuses, parenting
statuses, and physical abilities or disabilities.... In considering how a
specific policy affects women, feminists must analyze this intersectionality,
and the analysis must be inclusive of the voices of diverse women.
Claire Renzetti, Connecting the Dots: Women, Public Policy, and Social Control,
in Crime Control and Women 181, 187 (Susan L. Miller ed., 1998); see also
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and the Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991).
38. See generally Coker, supra note 14 (advocating the adoption of a material
resources test which evaluates the impact of any law, policy, or program on
battered women's material resources and placing poor women and particularly
poor women of color as the standard of measure).
39. Id. at 1011.
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unlikely to meet the needs of poor women and women of
color.
In this article I discuss four areas in which mandatory
policies present difficulties for feminist law reformers. The
first area of difficulty is whether and how crime policies
can prevent battering recidivism. The second is the role
individual women's choices should play in determining the
state's response to battering. The third is the degree to
which mandatory policies are necessary in order to ensure
that the state responds to domestic violence. The fourth is
the degree to which mandatory policies are necessary or
helpful in expressing the worth of battered women or
society's rejection of battering.
In Section I, Controlling Men Who Batter: The
Dilemma of Differential Deterrence," I examine the
evidence that arrest acts as a specific deterrent to future
violence, concluding that the best evidence is that arrest
provides modest but generally short-lived deterrence.41
More importantly, arrest of unemployed men 42 or men who
reside in socially disorganized neighborhoods 43 may
actually result in more incidents of violence than does
separation of the parties or other police action. Studies of
the effects on recidivism of "coordinated community
response" programs are more encouraging.44
These
programs include arrest and prosecution within a range of
sanctions and services. Some studies find a deterrent effect
40. See infra page 814.
41. See infra pages 814-15.
42. See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in
Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 Am. Soc. Rev.
680, 686 (1992) (noting that among married and employed batterers, arrest

reduced subsequent violence, but among unmarried and unemployed batterers,
arrest was associated with 53.5% increase in subsequent violence).
43. See Elizabeth Marie Marciniak, Community Policing of Domestic Violence:
Neighborhood Differences in the Effect of Arrest (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with author) (analyzing Milwaukee
data on the effects of arrest on domestic violence recidivism and finding that
arrestees living in census tracts with high levels of female-headed households,
families receiving welfare, poverty, high divorce rates, and high unemployment
had higher domestic violence recidivism rates post-arrest).
44. See infra notes 60-61 and text accompanying.
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for those batterers who are subjected to the "full"
coordinated treatment,45 while others find no deterrent
46
effect.

In Section II, Increasing State Control of Women: The
Battered Women's Agency

Dilemma,47

I examine the

question of how much importance should be attached to
individual women's preferences regarding mandatory
policies. On the one hand, given our awareness of the
batterer's potential to control the victim, 48 it is not clear

what weight should be given to women's preferences
regarding criminal justice processing. On the other hand,
mandatory policies increase state control of women, and
this is particularly true for those women already
vulnerable to state intervention. I examine three ways in
which mandatory policies create a risk of greater state
control of women: (a) mandatory policies increase the risk
that battered women will be arrested for domestic violence;
(b) mandatory policies increase the risk of unwarranted
removal of children by state child protection agencies; (c)
mandatory policies increase the risk that women involved,
even peripherally, in criminal conduct will be prosecuted.
The problem lies in reckoning both with the coercive power
of the state and the coercive power of the abuser to control
women's lives.
In Section III, Controlling the State: The Organizing
Dilemma,49 I examine the importance of mandatory policies
in ensuring that police and prosecutors protect battered
women. Mandatory policies may aid in preventing the
neglect that has amounted to state support for battering.
Mandatory policies may also serve as an organizing tool for
the battered women's movement in that they provide a
legitimate rationale for movement advocates to have an
45. See infra note 61.
46. See infra note 60.
47. See infra page 821.
48. See Stark, supra note 23, at 121 (coercive control describes "the systemic
fusion of social and individual dominance that undermines the physical,
psychological, or political autonomy of even the strongest, most aggressive and
capable women.").
49. See infra page 841.
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ongoing role within the criminal justice system, and they
offer a bright-line test around which to negotiate with
police regarding their response to battered women.
However, mandatory policies are sometimes implemented
in areas with weak or non-existent battered women's
advocacy organizations. Further, even where such
organizations exist, they are not always representative of
the interests of all battered women, particularly poor
women and women of color.
In Section IV, Controlling the Message: The Dilemma
50 I examine the potential
of Expressing Social Disapproval,
of mandatory policies to "send a message." Mandatory
policies may "send a message" to society that battered
women have worth, that battering is morally reprehensible,
and that battering is a public rather than a private
problem. However, the message of mandatory policies is
likely to vary depending on the context in which it is
"heard." I discuss several ways in which mandatory policies
may have disproportionately negative effects and carry
disproportionately negative meanings for some members of
subordinated communities.
In the Conclusion, I argue that battered women's
advocates must place women's material conditions at the
center of our efforts. Increasing women's material resources
will lessen the violence that women suffer. I suggest
strategies for addressing the dual vulnerability of poor
women to the violence of abusive men and to the violence of
the state.
I. CONTROLLING MEN WHO BATTER: THE DILEMMA OF
DIFFERENTIAL DETERRENCE

Most scholarly attention to mandatory policies lies in
social science research regarding mandatory arrest." The
National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") funded studies of
50. See infra page 849.

51. See Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter
Domestic Violence?, in Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work?, supra note 23,
at 43, 45 (describing arrest replication studies in six cities).
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arrest effects in six major metropolitan areas, 52 which
together comprise a significant part of the research in this
area. The NIJ studies were designed to test the specific
deterrence effects of arrest against the effects of other
police actions which included separating the couples,
issuing a citation, and (in one study) issuing an arrest
warrant for an absent suspect. 3 Though the results of the
studies varied somewhat across locations, the NIJ
researchers generally concluded that arrest had at best a
modest and short-lived deterrent effect.5 4 Lawrence
Sherman's reevaluation of NIJ study data presents a
greater challenge to the use of mandatory arrest policies.
Sherman concluded that when unemployed men were
arrested, their re-offending rates actually increased.5
Many studies point to factors other than arrest as
strong predictors of recidivism. For example, several
studies find that offenders who have prior histories of
domestic violence or of other violent crimes,55 offenders who
52. Id.
53. Schmidt & Sherman supra note 51, at 45 (the Omaha study examined the
deterrence effect of issuing an arrest warrant whenever the offender was absent
when the police arrived and there was probable cause to believe he had
committed a crime of domestic violence).
54. See Franklyn Dunford et al., The Omaha Domestic Violence Police
Experiment-Final Report of the National Institute of Justice and the City of
Omaha 34 (1989) (finding that both arrest measures and victim interviews found
no significant difference in recidivism between offenders who were arrested and
those separated or counseled); Hirschel, supra note 30, at 13 (reporting no
significant difference in recidivism between three treatment groups); Antony M.
Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton, Formal and Informal Deterrents to Domestic
Violence: The Dade County Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 Am. Soc. Rev. 691,
694-95 (1992) (finding no statistically significant effect of arrest on the occurrence
of a subsequent spouse assault, but when employed suspects were disaggregated
from the whole, arrest acted as a significant deterrent for those employed);
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to Long-Term Escalation:
Short-Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 Criminology 821
(1991) (short arrest had a substantial initial deterrent effect, but the effect ended
at thirty days, and was followed by higher long-term recidivism effects than no
arrest).
55. Sherman supra note 42.
56. See, e.g, Robert C. Davis et al., The Deterrent Effect of Prosecuting
Domestic Violence Misdemeanors, 44 Crime & Delinq. 434, 438-39 (1998) ("Both
prior misdemeanor convictions and battery arrests without conviction contributed
independently to an increased risk of recidivism."); Eve Buzawa et al., Response
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are younger,57 and those who are unemployed"8 are more
likely to re-offend.
Studies of coordinated community intervention
programs are more encouraging. Coordinated community
interventions programs (CIP's) or coordinated community
response programs involve a system-wide response to
battering in which arrest and prosecution policies are
coupled with batterer's treatment programs and immediate
and significant outreach and advocacy for victims.'9 While
some researchers find no significant difference in specific
deterrence for those subject to the full range of responses in
a CIP,60 other research finds that the coordination and

range of6 interventions results in lower rates of reoffending.
to Domestic Violence in a Pro-Active Court Setting, Executive Summary (#95-IJCX-0027) 24 (1999) (study of criminal justice response concludes that "the
[domestic violence] offender's prior criminal history and age at first offense are
the real keys to predicting re-offending....-).
57. See Carolyn M. West, Lifting the Tolitical Gag Order: Breadng the
Silence Around Partner Violence in Ethnic Minority Families, in Partner
Violence: A Comprehensive Review of 20 Years of Research 184, 193 (Jana L.
Jasinski & Linda Meyer Williams eds., 1998) (domestic violence rates are highest
for those under 30 years of age).
58. See generally Sherman, supra note 42. The effect may be interactive, in
that those suspects with a higher "stake-in-conformity" as measured by
employment, stability in residence, socioeconomic status, and marital status, are
more likely to be deterred by criminal interventions. Id.; see also Amy
Thistlethwaite et al., Severity Dispositions and Domestic Violence Recidivism, 44
Crime & Delinq. 388, 395 (1998) (the cumulative effect of stake-in-conformity
variables in combination with jail and probation or a fine and probation was
significantly to decrease incidents of re-abuse post-arrest; the most consistent
findings were for length of employment, length of residence, and neighborhood
SES in relation to the severity of punishment; contrary to prediction, being
unmarried related to lower recidivism).
59. See generally Jeffrey L. Edleson, Coordinated Community Response, in
Woman Battering- Policy Responses, supra note 31, at 203.
60. See, e.g., Buzawa et al.,
supra note 56, at 163, 165 (study of Quincy
District Court's integrated system-wide response did not find differences in
recidivism rates related to different intervention strategies including whether or
not the defendant was prosecuted, whether or not prosecution resulted in
subsequent court supervision, or whether or not the defendant completed a
batterer's treatment program).
61. See, e.g., Christopher M. Murphy et al., Coordinated Community
Intervention for Domestic Abusers: Intervention System Involvement and
Criminal Recidivism, 13 J. Fam. Violence 263 (1998) (finding that the cumulative
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There are far fewer studies of prosecution's effects on
recidivism, but of those that exist, several find that no
particular outcome of prosecution is significantly related to
recidivism.62 David Ford and Mary Jean Regoli's study of
prosecution effects compared cases in which women were
allowed to drop charges with those cases where victims had
no such choice." Regardless of the case outcome, there was
a fifty percent reduction in violence in the six months
following case resolution.64 The group of women who
initiated charges and were permitted to drop, but who
chose not to do so, experienced less recidivism than did
women who were not allowed to drop charges.65 Women in
the drop-permitted group who chose to drop charges,
however, were at the greatest risk of re-abuse.66 The
researchers conclude that "any intervention helps"

7

and

recommend that women be allowed to "determine the

effects of successful prosecution, probation monitoring, and completion of court

ordered counseling resulted in lower recidivism rates). But see Thistlethwaite et
al., supra note 58, at 396 (while length of jail sentences or probation were not
significant predictors of recidivism, the combination of jail sentences and
probation or a fine and probation correlated significantly with reduced recidivism
compared to jail alone, fine alone, or probation alone); Steinman, supra note 31
(comparing arrest outcomes in period prior to adoption of coordinated response
with outcomes after adoption of response and finding that arrest was associated
with less re-offending in the latter period, but not in the first period); see also
Richard M. Tolman & Arlene Weisz, Coordinated Community Intervention for
Domestic Violence: The Effects of Arrest and Prosecution on Recidivism of
Woman Abuse Perpetrators, 41 Crime & Delinq. 481, 491-92 (1995) ("recidivism
drops progressively for those who complete the most protocol steps [of a
coordinated community response].
").
62. See, e.g., Davis, et al. supra note 56, at 441 (the researchers found no
differences in recidivism in domestic violence misdemeanor cases that related to
prosecution outcomes including nolles, dismissals, probation with treatment, and
jail sentences).
63. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife
Assaulters: Process, Problems & Effects, in The Impact of Police Laying Charges
1n Legal Responses to Wife Assault: Current Trends & Evaluation 127, 157 (N.
Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (48% of those allowed to drop the charges chose to drop the
charges).
64. Id. at 153.
65. Id. at 158.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 157.
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prosecutorial track for court outcomes." 5 We cannot know
whether or not the fact that women chose to drop charges
resulted in their revicitimiztion or whether the women who
dropped made accurate assessments that prosecution
would not make them any safer. However, other research
suggests that battered women who oppose arrest and
in further
prosecution because they predict it will result
69
violence are often accurate in their assessment.
Little of this empirical research on deterrence
examines whether arrest and prosecution results differ for
poor women, women of color, or immigrant women. 0
Anecdotal evidence suggests that each of these positions

68. Id. at 158. Even if arrest did provide a strong specific deterrence effect, we
would still worry about the minority of women who were not made safer,
particularly if those women opposed arrest because they believed (correctly, as it
turned out) that their danger would increase (or at least not diminish) postarrest, or if they believed that arrest would have other negative effects on their
life. For research that documents the accuracy of battered women's predictions of
future violence, see Weisz et al., supra note 61 (battered women's prediction of
future severe abuse significantly improved the accuracy of other risk assessment
tools). Further, as I explain in greater detail later, even if arrest were to deter
future violence, it may have corollary negative effects that out-weigh the benefits
of deterrence for some women. See infra section II, pages 821-41.
69. See Buzawa, et al., supra note 56, at 19-20 (study of criminal justice
intervention found that two groups of victims were most likely to report that
criminal justice intervention made them more fearful or to believe that future
criminal intervention would not be in their best interest: those involved with the
most serious offenders and those whose offenders were new to the criminal justice
system; those involved with the most serious offenders had "accurately
determined that they were in greater danger of retaliation as a result of criminal
justice intervention).
70. None of the originally published studies from the NIJ studies of arrest
effects on recidivism examined racial differences among victims. However, a
subsequent review of the data in North Carolina found that African American
women were more likely to report abuse to the police than were White women.
See Ira W. Hutchison & J. David Hirschel, Abused Women: Help-Seeking
Strategies and Police Utilization, 4 Violence Against Women 436 (1998); see also
Bachman & Coker, supra note 31 (review of National Crime Victimization Survey
during 1987-1992 found that Black victims were more likely to report their
victimization to the police than were others); Lawrence A. Greenfeld et al.,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Factbook, U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ-167237, Violence
by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or Former Spouses,
Boyfriends, and Girlfriends 13 (Mar. 1998) (reporting based on the National
Crime Victimization Survey found that Black women are more likely to report a
violent victimization to the police than are other women).
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brings structural constraints that shape the effects of
arrest in women's lives. 71 Some research suggests that

women's access to material resources makes a difference in
their vulnerability to recurring violence. 72

For example,

research that compared two groups of battered women
found that those who met twice weekly with an advocate
who assisted them in gaining access to community
resources,7 3 reported significantly less abuse two years
71. See section II, infra pages 821-41.
72. Women's access to material resources is a critical factor in determining
their vulnerability to domestic violence. See generally Coker, supra note 14;
James Ptacek, Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of Judicial
Responses 22-24 (1999) (reviewing data from various studies and finding that
domestic violence is more prevalent and more severe in low-income families);
Angela Browne & Shari S. Bassuk, Intimate Violence in the Lives of Homeless
and Poor Housed Women: Prevalence and Patterns in an Ethnically Diverse
Sample, 67 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 261, 263 (1997) (citing National Family
Violence Survey finding that husband's unemployment significantly predicted
prevalence of husband-to-wife violence); Richard J. Gelles, Through a Sociological
Lens: Social Structure and Family Violence, in Current Controversies On Family
Violence 31, 33 (Richard J. Gelles & Domileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) (stating that
domestic violence occurs in all social and economic groups, but risk is greatest for
those that are poor, that are married to men that are unemployed or that hold low
prestige jobs); Angela M. Moore, Intimate Violence: Does Socioeconomic Status
Matter?, in Violence Between Intimate Partners: Patterns, Causes, and Effects
90, 96 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997) (reviewing data regarding correlation of low
socio-economic status and domestic violence and concluding that "[w]omen on the
lower end of the economic scale are at greater risk of victimization than their
counterparts at the higher levels."). This research does not support the view that
domestic violence is a problem only for low-income families. See Ptacek, supra, at
20-21 (describing "class myth" that domestic violence occurs only in low-income
families).
73. See Cris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, Reducing Violence Using
Community-Based Advocacy for Women with Abusive Partners, 67 J. Consulting
& Clinical Psychol. 43 (1999). The groups were matched in terms of
demographics, including race, age, employment status, and severity of violence.
Each group contained roughly the same number of women co-habitating with
their abuser and women separated from their abuser. See id. Forty-five percent
of the experimental group were African American women, 42% were EuroAmerican women, 7% were Latina, 2% were Asian American or American Indian.
Id.; Cris M. Sullivan et al., After the Crisis: A Needs Assessment of Women
Leaving a Domestic Violence Shelter, 7 Violence & Victims 267, 269 (1992). The
advocates met with the women twice weekly for ten weeks and assisted the
women in gaining access to educational resources, legal assistance, employment,
services for their children, housing, child care, transportation, financial
assistance, health care, and social supports. Id. at 51. The advocate worked with
the women for an average of 6.4 hours per week. Id. at 45. The advocates were
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later.74 The researchers believe that what made the
advocacy program succeed was that participants, not
advocates, guided the direction of the intervention, and the
"activities were designed to make the community more
responsive to the woman's needs,75 not to change the
survivor's thinking or belief system."

In summary, while some research suggests that arrest
and prosecution act as specific deterrents to future
violence, most of the research paints a more complicated
picture. First, some men who batter are more likely to be
deterred by formal sanctions than are others. It is the
interaction between criminal sanctions and the personal
and social characteristics of abusers that determines the
risk of recidivism, rather than the nature of criminal
justice intervention, per se. Second, providing advocacy
and assisting battered women in locating resources and
services is an important and often overlooked variable in
recidivism. Third, in evaluating the risk of re-abuse, it
may be particularly important to give deference to battered
women's assessments of their risk. Finally, given the
limited research, we cannot know the extent to which these
outcomes are representative of those experienced by poor
women, women of color, or immigrant women.
trained under graduate students who received school credit for their work. They
were supervised weekly. Id.
74. One out of four women in the experimental group experienced no abuse
during the twenty-four month follow up, while this was true for only one out of
ten women in the control group. Id. at 51. The women who met with advocates
also reported significantly less psychological abuse and depression and
significantly higher improvement in quality of life and level of social supports
than did those in the control group. Id. at 45. Only the difference in psychological
abuse scores did not reach statistical significance. Id. at 48. Both groups of
women reported that their quality of life and their social support networks had
improved and that the abuse had decreased; however the experimental group
reported significantly higher outcomes. Id. The interviews to determine
improvement were conducted by trained interviewers who were not the advocates,
thus decreasing the likelihood of responses that are skewed upwards. Of course,
this is still a danger with this kind of research.
75. Id. at 51. The project was based on the assumption that "survivors were
competent adults capable of making sound decisions for themselves." Id.
76. See Dutton, supra note 34, at 118-19. Dutton writes:
Results of research including only Anglo American women cannot be
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II. INCREASING STATE CONTROL OF WOMEN: THE

BATTERED WOMEN'S AGENCY DILEMMA
Martha Mahoney writes that "[aill work with
subordinated people confronts...
the challenge of
analyzing structures of oppression while including an
account of the resistance, struggles, and achievements of
the oppressed."7 A number of feminist scholars propose
using the term "agency" to describe this resistance and
achievement.
The concept of agency rests on the
realization that autonomy for subordinated persons is
always partial, contingent, and emerging.78
Kathryn
Abrams's conception of agency has "a political dimension
to... [the] process of recognizing and reflecting on the
influence on social norms ....[that] make it more difficult
for women to develop independent self-conceptions."7 9 Thus,
agency requires a collective endeavor because it is "only
through conversation with others who have confronted
similar feelings that a woman becomes aware that her selfconception does not simply reflect her own shortcomings,
but is a function of views and expectations that are
assumed to apply to women of color, women living in poverty, or women
whose native language is other than English. Research on battering and
its effects for disenfranchised women, such as the homeless, the seriously
and chronically mentally ill, and immigrants, is necessary to capture the
unique contextual influences that define the life circumstances of these
groups of battered women.
Id.
77. Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives,
Violence, and Agency, in The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of
Domestic Abuse 54, 59 (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994)
[hereinafter The Public Nature of Private Violence]; see also Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 520, 527 (1992) (describing
the false dichotomous descriptions of battered women as either victims or agents).
78. See generally Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's
Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's
Rts. L. Rep. 195 (1986); Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 805 (1999); Kathryn
Abrams, Changing the Subject: Agency, Law & Feminist Legal Theory
(forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 825, on file with author) [hereinafter Changing
the Subject].
79. Abrams, Changing the Subject, supra note 78, at 826.
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instilled socially.""
In contrast to these conceptions of agency, law often
places human character at polar extremes: either all-agent
or all-victim."' As Mahoney writes, "agency and
victimization are each known by the absence of the other:
you are an agent if you are not a victim, and you are a
victim if you are in no way an agent."8 2 Elizabeth
Schneider recognized early the problem this presented for
battered women who must articulate both their ability to
be agents (for example, in child custody proceedings) and
their victimization (for example, in protection order
hearings).8
To some extent, this false dichotomy of victimization
versus agency plagues discussions of mandatory policies,

but even when that is not the case, giving effect to women's
agency in the context of criminal responses to domestic
violence has presented difficulties for feminist law
reformers. Some abusive men intimidate, harass, threaten,
and physically force women to abandon criminal charges.8 4
This fact is central to feminist arguments for mandatory
policies. The concern is that giving battered women a
"choice" whether to pursue criminal charges means giving
8 5 In addition, ongoing
the choice to batterers
humiliation
80. Id. at 827-28. Susan Williams argues for a somewhat similar "narrative"
concept of autonomy. Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil

Society, 72 Ind. L.J. 417, 430 (1997). The narrative process requires that a
woman "work with her own experiences and the stories, values, and concepts that
are available to her in whatever culture(s) she inhabits .... " Id. Williams argues
that to be autonomous, individuals must have a capacity for self-knowledge, have
self-trust or self-esteem, and must have the ability to appreciate others evaluative
standards. Id. at 441.
81. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 77, at 548-49:
We now alternate between visions of the battered woman as agent-as
cause or provocateur of the battering-and the battered woman as helpless
victim.... [P]ortraying women solely as victims or solely as agents is
neither accurate nor adequate to explain the complex realities of women's
lives.
82. Mahoney, supra note 77, at 64.
83. See generally Schneider, supra note 77.
84. See Machaela M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State:
The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 643, 687 (1997).
85. Ellen L. Pence, Some Thoughts on Philosophy, Coordinating Community
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and assaults on personhood may encourage some women to
believe that they are partially responsible for their
partner's violence which may compromise their ability to
judge their own best interest. 7 Thus, simple accounts of
women's agency-"if a woman wants to live in a violent
relationship, it is her choice"--fail to account for the level
of coercion and restraint operating in battered women's
lives.
On the other hand, the batterer is not the only agent of
violence and coercion that women face. State mechanisms
of control act powerfully in women's lives, particularly in
the lives of poor women. Women risk increasing state
control in their lives when they negotiate with the state for
assistance against the private domination of their partners
or ex-partners.
The danger is that feminist law reformers will both
overestimate the state's power to do good and
underestimate the power of the state to do harm. Further,
women's decisions whether or not to support criminal
intervention are often related to whether or not they can
afford to prioritize prosecution over other more immediate
concerns such as food, employment, and childcare. Thus,
the second danger is that feminist law reformers will
overlook the importance of women's material resources in
the calculus of whether or not state intervention is likely to
do harm or good.

Responses to Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond 25 (Ellen L.
Pence & Melanie F. Shepard eds., 1999); Hoctor, supra note 84, at 687 ("[b]ecause
batterers have such overwhelming control over their victims[,l [when victims
were allowed to drop charges] ... batterers, in effect, were being given control
over the disposition of their own criminal case.").
86. See Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should the Police Respond to Domestic

Violence: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandatory Arrest, 39 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 765, 781 (1999) (battered women may believe that they are
responsible for their abuser's violence).
87. See, e.g., id.; Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women's Syndrome and Self-

Defense, 6 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 321, 330 (1992) (describing the
effects of learned helplessness).
88. Hanna, supra note 20, at 1874 (quoting a judge's response to a battered
woman's request that he drop criminal charges against her abuser).
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A. Overestimatingthe Power of the State to Do Good
I identify two ways in which feminist support for
mandatory policies may overestimate the power of the state
to assist battered women. The first is to overestimate the
power of the state to protect women. As I discuss in
Section I, the equivocal data regarding the effects of arrest
and prosecution on batterer recidivism does not warrant
strong confidence that criminal intervention will prevent
further abuse. In addition, this focus on the protective
power of the state fails to account for the number of ways
in which women successfully stop battering. The second
way in which feminist support for mandatory policies may
overestimate the state's power to do good is found in those
arguments that focus on future changes in society brought
about by crime control policies. This confidence in the
ability of changes in crime policy to bring about social
change is unwarranted.
1. Overestimating the Protection the Criminal Justice
System Affords
Cheryl Hanna, in reflecting on her experiences as a
domestic violence prosecutor, describes a case in which the
judge dismissed charges at the complainant's request."9
When Hanna next encounters this woman, the woman has
a broken nose, severe bruising, and has lost forty pounds
from the stress.90 Women often experience renewed
violence, despite the promises of batterers to reform,9' but
the point of Hanna's story is not merely that domestic
violence sometimes escalates. The implicit message of the
narrative is that the woman would have been safe (or safer)

89. Id. at 1875.

90. Id.
91. Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See that Judges May Miss:

A Unique Guide to Custody Decisions When Spouse Abuse is Charged, The
Judge's Journal, at 9, 10, Spring 1998 (batterers sometimes promise never to
abuse again).
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if only the judge had refused to drop charges.2 Hanna sets
up a dichotomy: Women can be allowed to make the
"wrong" decision (against prosecution) or the state can
protect their interests in stopping the violence (and proceed
with prosecution). This unfairly stacks the deck in favor of
mandated prosecution policies.
Any choice a battered woman makes is, to some extent,
playing the odds. Narratives like Hanna's rest on two
implicit and questionable assumptions. The first is that
cooperation with the system is more likely to increase a
woman's safety than is non-cooperation.
The second
assumption regards the relevant universe of choice: A
woman chooses either to be wholly cooperative with
92. Hanna makes this implicit presumption clear when she later in the same
article concludes: "[W1f
a battered woman does not cooperate.... and the case
results in dismissal, she is likely to be beaten again.... [Ilf the prosecution is
successful, she may never be victimized by anyone again. ... ."). Hanna, supra note

20, at 1895. This is a common form of narrative in the literature that supports
no-drop prosecution. See, e.g., Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for
Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA Women's L.J. 173, 179 (1997). Wills relates the
story of a woman who was killed by her estranged husband. When he was first
arrested for assaulting her the woman begged that the prosecutor drop the
charges. When the prosecutor refused to drop charges, the victim made herself
.unavailable" for trial and the charges were dismissed for lack of evidence. The
woman did not report her abuser's subsequent assaults, including one in which he
tried to run her over with a car. She did, however, call the police when he
grabbed their infant child and put her in the car unrestrained. The police
arrested her husband, but he was released quickly when his family posted bail.
The same day he purchased a gun and killed her. Wills understands the moral of
this story to be that the victim was wrong to want charges dropped in the first
instance: "many battered women fail to see that criminal intervention can assist
in the shared goal of getting their abuser to stop the violence." Id. However, like
Hanna's narrative, Wills's story does not prove her conclusion. There is no
evidence that this victim would have been made safer had she cooperated with
prosecution the first time. In fact, when she did cooperate with criminal
intervention (when her husband kidnapped her child), her husband was released
quickly and she was murdered. Further, the prosecutor's refusal to drop charges
when she requested that she do so may explain why the victim did not report her
husband's later attacks.
93. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 71, 106-07 (1992) (some
battered women are "entrapped in a web of the [abuser's] ... making, in which
every action she takes to protect herself threatens to reinforce his view that she's
attacking him; thus, actions taken to increase her safety also have the potential
to increase her danger.").
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prosecution or she chooses to be wholly uncooperative with
prosecution.
The assumption that the criminal justice system offers
the best chance of increasing a woman's safety overstates
the efficacy of the system in stopping the violence while
simultaneously understating the importance of the
availability of women's other resources. As described in
Section I, the evidence for the deterrent value of arrest and
prosecution is equivocal.
Prosecution (or other state
intervention) is no guarantee that the violence will stop. 4
A woman who opposes prosecution is taking a calculated
risk, as is the woman who actively pursues prosecution.
Neither she, nor the judge or the prosecutor, can know with
certainty which action will result in less violence. The
problem is not that the batterer's coercion is not real, but
rather that it is not always clear that the criminal justice
system offers a better alternative.
The assumption that women are safest when they
cooperate with prosecution also ignores the stories of the
women who are successful in stopping the violence in their
lives.95 Lee Bowker's study of women who solved their
domestic violence problem found that women employ a
number of strategies which may or may not include
criminal justice intervention, and that some women are
successful at stopping the violence and resuming their
relationship with their formerly abusive partner.96
But "[w]omen's successes at ending violence are
virtually invisible."97 Criminal justice system actors are
unlikely to see (again) the women who accurately assess
that non-cooperation is in their best interest.98 Prosecutors
and police officers will not see the women who elect noncooperation in return for concessions from the batterer and

94. Hanna elsewhere acknowledges that this is the case. Hanna, supra note
20, at 1871 ("state intervention into women's lives does not necessarily promote
their equality, safety, or well-being.").
95. See generally Lee H. Bowker, Beating Wife-Beating (1983).
96. Id.
97. Mahoney, supra note 77, at 76.
98. See id.
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who do not experience subsequent abuse. They will not see
the women who reunite with a formerly abusive partner
and no longer experience abuse.9 9 In addition, they may
not see the women for whom arrest and prosecution
resulted in increased violence. Recent research regarding
the effects of a pro-arrest policy found that two groups of
women were the most likely to be strongly opposed to
mandatory arrest."° The first were those who had
experienced minor violence and who accurately predicted
that they were not in danger. 10 1 The second were those
women who were in extreme danger from very violent
partners and who predicted accurately that arrest and
prosecution would not make them any safer.0 2
The assumption that the universe of choice is limited
to total cooperation with prosecution versus noncooperation may also be unwarranted. Women attempt to
strategically use formal system resources such as
prosecution. 01 3 As Judith Wittner concludes from her study
99. Mahoney relates the story of a woman who, with help from her church,
ended her abusive husband's violence. The church assisted her in negotiating for
a requirement that the husband work with a men's prayer group, attend
counseling, and take a sabbatical from his campus ministry position. The couple
separated initially, but reconciled after two years and the woman reported no
further abuse. Id. 76-77. A battered women's counselor in the Navajo Nation
related her own personal story that is quite similar. She and her abusive partner
separated for two years. During the separation period he began alcohol
treatment and counseling and she returned to school and became financially
independent. They reconciled and there has been no renewed violence. See
Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 68 (1999).
100. Buzawa, et al., supra note 56.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note
on Empowering Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 Law & Soc'y Rev.
313, 314 (1991) (noting that women may desire to use prosecution as a power
resource to negotiate more safety and more control in their lives); Adele Harrell &
Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, in
Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work?, supra note 23, at 214, 219 (of the 40%
of women studied who did not return for a permanent restraining order, 64%
reported that the temporary order had stopped their partner's abuse at least
temporarily); Wittner, supra note 31 (women used specialized domestic violence
court strategically to gain greater control over their lives, but did not necessarily
complete legal processes).
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of a domestic violence court, some women "[want] the right
to tell their stories in public, authority to participate in the
determination of punishments, and freedom to fashion
courses of legal action suited to themselves rather than to
arbitrary demands of the judicial system. " 1 4

Others

studies find that some battered women successfully use the
threat of criminal prosecution to gain much needed
leverage in the relationship 05
The process used by prosecutors may be an important
determinant of whether or not women are able to
successfully use the power the state in this fashion. Linda
Mills argues that mandatory policies "rob battered women
of an important opportunity to acknowledge and reject
patterns of abuse."1 6 Mills proposes that prosecutors adopt
the perspective of the survivor of domestic violence'017 and

104. Wittner, supra note 31, at 83. Wittner notes of legal professionals in a
dedicated domestic violence court:
[So convinced were [legal professionals] ... that adherence to court
procedures offered the only route to safety and protection, they seldom
entertained the notion that certain complainants had other, more fruitful
agendas in involving the law. So committed were they to a legal timetable
that they viewed a woman's repeated use of the court as proof that her
failure to follow through to the end of a case doomed her to continued
victimization.
Id. at 89.
105. Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence:
From Victim Choice to Victim Empowerment, 40 Brit. J. Criminology 14, 23
(2000). Hoyle and Sanders' interviews with battered women found that some
opposed prosecution because "the arrest achieved the changes which the victim
sought in her partner's behaviour." Id. It is important not to overstate this point,
however. Fear of retaliation was the most common reason women gave for
opposing prosecution. Id. at 24. Nonetheless, as the authors note, "different
women have different aims and needs .... " Id. at 24.
106. Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 550, 555 (1999). By mandating processes that the
woman may not yet be ready to endorse, mandatory policies push women to align
with their batterer and view the state as an enemy. Id.
107. Id. at 605 ("strategies should begin 'where the battered woman is' rather
than where others 'expect' her to be"); id. at 589 (forcing a victim to testify may
"cause her to realign with [the batterer] ... rather than face the state's
violence."). For a contrary argument, see Hanna, supra note 20, at 1552
(criticizing battered women's advocates because they want prosecutors to be both
therapist and trial attorney, "[ylet, supporting the victim emotionally and holding
the batterer criminally responsible are often conflicting goals.").
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hear "[a battered woman's] story on her terms and in ways
that take into account her particular circumstances."0 8
2. Overestimating the Ability of Criminal Justice
Reforms to Effect Future Social Change
A separate agency problem is presented by arguments
that women should be coerced to cooperate with
prosecution not because it is in their best interest, but
because it will benefit other women'0 9 or future women."'
Hanna argues that even though prosecution against a
woman's wishes may harm some women, limits on the
autonomy of individual women is justified because
prosecution is good for "women overall.""' Similarly, Ellen
Pence compares battered women to African Americans who
first integrated public schools.
We often liken this dilemma to that of civil rights activists
trying to desegregate lunch counters, schools, and buses in
Jim Crow states. When the first children walked into
108. Mills, supra note 106, at 605. Mills's opposition to mandatory policies is
part of a more ambitious project to re-define the role of professional response to a

victim-centered approach. In her book, The Heart of Intimate Abuse, Mills
argues that not only criminal justice system actors, but child protection and
health care system actors must adopt an empowerment model for working with
battered women. Linda G. Mills, The Heart of Intimate Abuse: New
Interventions, in Child Welfare, Criminal Justice, and Health Settings (1998).
Hanna and Mills have a fundamental difference in perspective in that Hanna
seeks to answer a policy question without challenging the current institutional
framework within which the question is framed, while Mills seeks to remake that
system. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 20, at 1873 (noting that in any policy
debate, someone has to decide, Hanna writes that "[iun the criminal justice
system, the prosecutor maintains discretion as to which cases are pursued. The
question, then, is not who decides, but how should the decision be made.").
109. Hanna, supra note 20, at 1870.
110. See Pence, supra note 85, at 33.
111. Hanna, supra note 20, at 1870 ("Although removing a woman's right to
choose whether to prosecute may undermine her autonomy, such an infringement
on her liberty is necessary to protect women overall."). Mills is particularly
critical of this rationale for mandatory policies: "In my view, individual survivors
should not be exploited-even for the laudable goal of eliminating gender
oppression-especially when those survivors are likely to be women of color and,
more often than not, exploited in other contexts by the white male and female
majorities." Mills, supra note 106, at 593.
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previously all-White schools, those children did not get a
better education. We have all seen the news stories of those
tense days when African American children walked through
crowds of screaming, threatening White adults. They
entered empty classrooms. The victory was for those who
followed. When the civil rights movement used these
children to change a basic inequality in society, it secured
an agreement from the government to call out the National
Guard to protect them. The challenge to those of us who
argue that we need to criminalize domestic violence, even
when the victim wants us to back off, is to put into place
safeguards equivalent to the National Guard's protection of
Black children in desegregating Southern schools." 2
These arguments reflect a certainty about the
potential for future social change through criminal justice
reform that is both unwarranted and dangerous. This kind
of unwarranted certainty in the efficacy of social change
through criminal justice reform facilitates ignoring today's
harm because of a belief that it will be better in the future.
B. Underestimating the Power of the State to do Harm
Mandatory policies make battered women more
vulnerable to state control. This vulnerability is
particularly true for women who are marginalized by their
race, ethnicity, class, or immigrant status. In this section,
I examine three ways in which mandatory policies increase
the risk of state control of women. The first risk occurs
when battered women are themselves arrested for domestic
violence. The second risk of increased state control occurs
when criminal justice intervention results in unwarranted
intervention from the state child protection agency. The
third risk is for women who are involved, even
peripherally, in criminal activity, much of which is related
112. Pence, supra note 85, at 33. To compare battered women draftees with
integrationist activists, turns agency on its head. Even if this analogy were
accurate, Pence fails to explain why coercing individuals in ways that are harmful
to them personally is justified because it is done in the name of progress. See
Mills, supra note 106, at 593.
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to their experience of battering.
1. When Battered Women are Arrested for Domestic
Violence
The first set of risks for increased state control flow
from the increased risk that battered women will be
arrested. When mandatory and pro-arrest policies are
adopted, more women are arrested for domestic violence." 3
Strong anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the women
arrested are victims of battering who are acting in self4
defense or who are responding to a pattern of abuse."
Arrests of battered women present serious collateral
risks that go beyond the threat of criminal punishment.
For example, conviction for domestic violence can result in
the deportation of a non-citizen." 5 Recent immigration law
reform allows the Attorney General to waive deportation in
the case of battered women who can prove that they are
"not the primary perpetrator of violence in the
relationship" 116 and that they were "acting in selfdefense."' 17 The difficulty with this standard is that many
women who are violent in response to ongoing battering

113. See Joan Zorza & Laurie Woods, National Center on Women and Family
Law, Mandatory Arrest: Problems and Possibilities 16 (1994) (noting that
"advocates report a widespread increase in arrests of women when police
departments adopted tougher arrest policies"); L. Kevin Hamberger & Theresa
Potente, Counseling Heterosexual Women Arrested for Domestic Violence:
Implications for Theory and Practice, 9 Victims & Violence 125, 126 (1994)
(finding that after Wisconsin instituted mandatory arrest, arrests of women
increased by twelve- fold compared to two-fold increase in arrests of men).
114. See Zorza & Woods, supra note 113; Hamberger & Potente, supra note
113, at 108. Margaret E. Martin, Double Your Trouble: Dual Arrest in Family
Violence, 12 J. of Far. Violence 139, 147 (1997) (study of stratified sample of all
family violence cases disposed in criminal courts in Connecticut during the first
six months of 1988 found that 33% of the adult intimate arrests were dual
arrests).
115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(E)(i)-(ii) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (stipulating that
classes of deportable aliens include those convicted of domestic violence, stalking,
or violation of protection orders, and crimes against children). For a discussion of
this problem, see generally Espenoza, supra note 29.
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(7).
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(7)(I).
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may not meet the legal requirements for self-defense in a
particular incident. For example, Cecelia Espenoza relates
the story of Paula, a battered immigrant woman from
Mexico, who received support from Lideras Campensinas.18
Paula, determined not to take her husband's abuse any
longer and, with a baseball bat in hand, told him to leave
the home. 119 He tried to return three times. Each time, he
left after Paula threatened him with the bat.120 In many
jurisdictions, Paula's actions would render her criminally
liable for domestic violence assault and thereby subject her

to mandatory arrest. 21 Since Paula was not in immediate
danger when she threatened her husband, it is not clear
that she would meet the self-defense requirements for the
waiver of deportation.
In addition to immigration consequences, battered
women who are arrested often lose the protection otherwise
afforded by special domestic violence legislation. For
example, evidence of an arrest, even if the women are not
charged, is sufficient in many states to prevent them from
benefiting from child custody laws that disfavor a violent
22
parent.1
118. Espenoza, supra note 29, at 196-97 (citing Pamela Warrick, A Life of Their
Own: They Have Been the Victims of Abusive Men-Husbands, Bosses-And
Have Spent Years Laboring in the Fields, But Farm Worker Women Are Learning
How to Fight for Their Rights, L.A. Times, June 7, 1996, at El). Prior to the new
waiver legislation, some women were rendered deportable. For example, consider
the story of Maria Sanchez, related in a Washington Post story. Maria's husband
came home drunk, pinned her on the couch, and began beating her. Maria bit his
back. Her husband called the police and Maria was arrested. She tried telling the
police that he had been beating her again and that she was defending herself but,
unlike her husband, she didn't speak English and the police spoke no Spanish.
When she went to court, Maria signed a form, printed in English, that waived her
right to counsel and entered a guilty plea to misdemeanor assault. Maria had no
understanding of the forms she was signing and the court's unqualified
interpreter was no help. At the time of the story, Maria faced deportation
proceedings, even though her husband had a prior record for domestic violence,
Philip P. Pan, Victimized Woman Faces Deportation, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 2000,
at Al.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 5 (discussing mandatory arrest provisions).
122. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 30-3-131 (Micbie 1998) (providing for a rebuttable
presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to be placed in the
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2. Battered Women and Child Protection Services
The second set of risks created by mandatory policy
flows from the interaction of mandatory policies with the
actions of other institutions of state control. The police
response may open a "Pandora's box... of other
institutional responses." 2 '
The most important such
interaction is that of child protection systems. Several
changes in child protection laws and policies have
increased dramatically the number of child abuse
investigations founded solely or primarily on the basis that
a child's parent is the victim of intimate abuse. 24 Some
police departments have developed policies that require
officers to report to child protection services every case in
which a child is present at a domestic violence call.2 5 In
addition, child protection organizations have broadened
custody of the perpetrator of family violence); 13 Del. Code Ann. § 705A (1999)
(same); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 125C.230 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (same); see
also, e.g., Zorza & Woods, supra note 113, at 24 (a battered woman who is
arrested may "lose the advantage meant to be given to her... in a custody
dispute.").
123. Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994:
Evaluation of the Mandatory Arrest Provisions, Third Interim Report to the
Governor and the Legislature 55 (Oct. 2000) (available from the State of New
York, Division of Criminal Justice Services) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
New York Evaluation of Mandatory Arrest Provisions].
124. See Somini Sengupta, Tough Justice: Taking a Child When One Parent is
Battered, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2000, at Al (describing New York City case in
which children were removed because the mother's estranged husband punched
her in the face while one child slept and the other was at school); interview with
Stacey Dougan, former Director, Greenberg TraurigFlorida Coalition Against
Domestic Violence Alliance, in Miami, Fla. (describing similar trend in Florida);
Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism
3, 35-37 (1999) (even though mother immediately reported her husband's abuse of
their daughter, obtained a restraining order against him that denied him access
to the child, and aided his prosecution, the state attorney filed failure to protect
charges against the mother).
125. See Telephone Interview by Stacey Bussel with Captain Drew Kirkland,
Portland, Oregon Police Department (June 6, 2000). Captain Kirkland explained
that officers are required to report the presence of children at any domestic
violence call. The police department's records division forwards the officer's
domestic violence reports in which children were present to the state child and
family protection agency. Id.
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dramatically the definition of child abuse to include
residing in a home in which domestic violence takes
place. 26 Children are removed even when the violence was
a one-time occurrence, and even when the children did not
witness the violence.127 The statements of rural battered
women in New York State capture the problem of the
intersection between child protection and mandatory
policies:
It does more damage to call the police... The call to the
police opened up so many doors. Then I had three different
services watching me and with the kids. Child protective
put me at risk for losing my children; they said, next time
they'll take the kids! I always thought the12police
were there
8
to help me. I would never call them again.

126. See, e.g., Sengupta, supra note 124 (describing cases in New York City).
127. See id.
128. New York Evaluation of Mandatory Arrest Provisions, supra note 123, at
55. Women reported the following additional reasons for being dissatisfied with
the police response: The police treated the victim with disrespect; the police
refused to do anything, including look for a hiding suspect; they did not take the
violence seriously. Id. at 54-55. Those who were satisfied with the police
reported the following reasons for their satisfaction: The police were respectful to
them; the police arrested the abuser. Some indicated that having the arrest
decision taken out of their hands contributed to their satisfaction with the police
response. Id. at 54. An additional dilemma faces both proponents and opponents
of mandatory policies. What little research exists that examines women's
preferences, suggest that they differ and, to some extent, those differences are
mutually exclusive. Some women want the criminal justice system to decide
whether or not to prosecute; others want the authority to decide for themselves.
See Edna Erez & Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women's
Assessment of the Criminal Processing System's Responses, 13 Violence &
Victims 251, 260 (1998) (survey of women who were victim complainants in
criminal domestic violence cases found that 68% thought victims should be
allowed to drop charges, 15% thought they should not be allowed to drop charges,
and 21% expressed no opinion; 49% thought women should be forced to testify,
39% did not know). This presents a problem for proposals that women be allowed
to decide whether or not they want the prosecutor to decide. See, e.g., Mills,
supra note 106, at 578 ([the battered woman] should decide whether she would
like to pursue [arrest and prosecution]... or whether she would prefer state
representatives to pursue arrest and prosecution on her behalf, and without her
active participation.") This option appears to be precisely the burden some
women seek to avoid, while other women desire to have the option.
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He beats me and I get [Child Protective] Services dropping
in on me three times a week. Meanwhile, no one is getting
him help."
Like so many other forms of state intervention, child
protection intervention is a double-edged sword. When a
child is in danger of serious harm, temporary removal of
the child from the home may be the only safe course, but
there are a number of problems with the way in which
current child welfare policy works in cases of domestic
violence. Child welfare workers and courts frequently
blame battered women for their children's exposure to
violence. 130 This blame suggests that the mother could
control or could avoid the batterer's violence. In many
cases, neither is true. Battering is often unpredictable:
Women are beaten for "failure" to have the proper
demeanor, for "failure" to prepare the "right" meal, for
"failure" to desire sex at the "right" times. 1' Separation is
no guarantee of safety. Most of the women who are killed
and most women who are seriously assaulted by an
intimate are separated at the time of the attack. 132 Thus,
separation often requires careful planning. "Despite welldocumented evidence that battered women are at greater
risk of harm from their abusers during separation, the
child protection system's traditional approach has been to
require battered women to leave their abusers immediately
129. New York Evaluation of Mandatory Arrest Provisions, supra note 123, at
55.

130. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure
to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 229
(1996) (describing case in which, despite the abuser's severe battering of the
mother, the court blamed the mother for her "inability to terminate relations with
the abuser and found that her inability to provide her child with a violence-free
environment demonstrated a 'willful failure' to meet the demands of her parental
responsibilities, thereby justifying the termination of her parental rights.").
131. See Coker, supra note 93, at 85 ("Abusive men blame their violence on
complaints about the woman: she's a bad housekeeper; she doesn't show the men
the proper deference; she's verbally aggressive; she's a poor mother .... [S]he's
not sexually responsive enough; she is--or desires to be-sexually unfaithful.").
132. See id. 93, at 71 n.2 (describing homicide research); see also Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 49-50 (1991) (describing the dangers of "separation assault.")
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or face the loss of their children."

Separation also
requires resources. Women who separate need money for
new housing-first and last month rent plus deposit, new
childcare arrangements, new school enrollments, and a
new job. Many women must make these arrangements
while
using
inadequate
and
unreliable
public
transportation. When women separate they often require a
restraining order. They must then distribute copies of the
order, along with a picture of the abuser, to the children's
schools and childcare providers and to the security
personnel at their work site.
The failure of child protection workers to understand
the dangers of separation and the importance of women's
material resources to their safety results in a failure to
provide the resources and support that battered women
most require.13 4 Women are often coerced into signing
"voluntary" plans that include agreements to participate in
such services as parenting classes and battered women's
support groups'3 5 but are not given assistance with the
resources needed to separate safely.'3 6
In addition, child protection workers often believe
stereotypes regarding battered women that make invisible
their acts of agency. 37 They are presumed to have mental
health problems that make them likely to "choose"
batterers. 35
Frequently these stereotypes of battered
113

133. Hon. Cindy S. Lederman et al., The Nexus Between Child Maltreatment
and Domestic Violence: A View from the Court, 2 Center for Families, Child. and
the Cts. J. 129, 129 (2000).
134. Id.
135. See Amy Sinden, 'Why Won't Mom Cooperate?': A Critique of Informality
in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 339 (1999) (describing the
coercion involved in "voluntary" plans). My own experience in coordinating a
battered women's program in Honolulu, Hawaii, was that women were often
unable to find employment and their safety was compromised because they were
required to attend so many "services."
136. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images Of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions
From Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 688, 741
(1998).
137. See Mahoney, supra note 77, at 71 (describing case where woman's
parental rights were terminated because a psychologist testified that she might
enter a second violent relationship).
138. See id.
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women intersect with and reinforce race- and class-based
stereotypes. Poor women and particularly poor African
American women are far more likely to be the subject of
charges of child neglect ' 39 than are other women. "In child
welfare cases, where the individual is pitted against the
vast power and resources of the state, the power imbalance
is extreme. And in the vast majority of cases, the fact that
the parent is female, poor, uneducated, and nonwhite,
140
exacerbates this inherent power disparity."

3. When Battered Women Are Involved in Criminal
Activity
Aggressive criminal intervention also threatens to
increase state control of battered women who are involved,
even peripherally, in criminal activity.'4 1 Battered women's
criminal activity is often connected to their abuse. For
example, battering partners coerce women into engaging in
crimes that involve illegal drugs or prostitution,'42 women

139. See, e.g., Gelles, supra note 72, at 34 ("[ploor and minority children are

more likely to be correctly and incorrectly reported for child abuse, whereas white
and middle-and upper-class families are much less likely to be correctly and

incorrectly reported for abuse") (emphasis in original); Dorothy E. Roberts, Is
There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation

Policy, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 112, 125-26 (1999). Roberts notes:
The injustice of the American foster care system... stems... from the
large number of children removed from their homes. The class and race
dimensions of foster care magnify this problem-virtually all of the parents
who lose custody of their children are poor, and a startling percentage are
black .... Moreover, once black children enter foster care, they remain
there longer, are moved more often, and receive less desirable placements
than white children.
140. Sinden, supra note 135, at 385.
141. As Dianne Martin notes, "bad' mothers [and] 'bad' girls... are never real
victims [in the crime control discourse,] ... [rather] they are subjected to ever
more invasive controls and surveillance .... " Martin, supra note 7, at 158.
142. See Beth Richie, Compelled to Crime: The Gender Entrapment of Battered
Black Women 114-16 (1996) (describing manner in which batterers force women
into illegal sex work); id. at 120-23 (recounting manner in which batterers forced
women to engage in theft); id. at 123-27 (finding that battered women developed
drug dependencies in order to establish deeper connections with their drugabusing partners). Kathleen Daly's study of women's pathways to felony court in
New Haven, Connecticut documents two pathways that underscore the
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sell drugs or sex in order to earn money to fund an escape
from battering partners, 43 and women use illegal drugs to
dull the physical and emotional pain of abuse.'" The
danger of identification, arrest, and conviction for drug
related offenses is much higher for women of color and
particularly for African American women who live in
heavily policed "drug zones." 45 Draconian drug laws with
severe
mandatory
minimum
sentences
increase
dramatically the risks associated with detection. 4
Further, mandatory sentencing regimes make it more
difficult for women to make traditional arguments about
their care taking responsibilities 47 or their abusive
connection between abusive partners, drug use, and drug related crimes.
Kathleen Daly, Gender Crime and Punishment 58 (1994) (finding that women's
pathways to felony court include being in relationships with violent men and
being associated with boyfriends, mates, or family members who use or sell
drugs).
143. See, e.g., Richie, supra note 142, at 126 (white woman arrested on drug
charges explains that she sold drugs in order to get an apartment: "I tried
working, but my husband found out, beat me up, and took my money ....I was
starting to save enough [through drug sales] to move out.").
144. See, e.g., Cynthia Chandler et al., Community-Based Alternative
Sentencing for HIV-Positive Women in the Criminal Justice System, 14 Berkeley
Women's L.J. 66, 78 (1999) ("Abuse survivors may also develop harmful drug
addictions attempting to self-medicate to forget or to recover from the assault.");
Mary Ann Dutton, Empowering and Healing the Battered Woman: A Model for
Assessment & Intervention 64 (1992) ("Substance abuse among battered women
functions as a means of self-medicating the distress and dysfunction (caused by
the battering] ...by reducing immediate anxiety and enhancing the numbing
effect, thus blocking out the experience of distress and emotional pain."); Richie,
supra note 142, at 125 (describing an interview with woman whose boyfriend
brought her morphine in order to dull the pain from broken bones and other
injuries caused by his beatings).
145. See Stephanie R. Bush-Baskette, The War on Drugs as a War Against
Black Women, in Crime Control and Women, supra note 37, at 113 (the increase
in Black women's incarceration rates is largely due to the "war on drugs"; Black
women are a greater percentage of the female prison population than Black men
are of the male prison population).
146. See generally Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. Chi.
Legal F. 25 (1994) ("Reagan and Bush administration crime bills year after year
increased penalties and extended mandatory minimum sentences for additional
drug crimes, a conservative Sentencing Commission toughened penalties even
more.., and prison populations tripled from 1980 onwards. ..").
147. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing- Single Moms, Battered
Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 905 (1993) (some courts recognize single

2001]

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW

partner's coercion.

839

148

The risks associated with arrest for drug activity are
not limited to the criminal law consequences. Women who
are arrested risk losing custody of their children. 4 9 They
may also be barred for life from receiving welfare benefits' 50
15
and their student financial aid may be compromised,
thus ensuring their continued economic dependence on
male partners and their continued vulnerability to further
abuse.

152

parent responsibilities as a reason for a downward departure from federal
sentencing guidelines, while others do not). Raeder documents the gender
disparity in refusal to recognize childcare responsibilities: far more women than
men are single parents. In addition, the impact of refusal to see single parenting
as a reason for downward departure may affect African American women more
than white women because single parenting is much more prevalent among
African American women. Id. at 950. Compare United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d
31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990) (defendant's situation as a single
parent whose incarceration would result in her children's placement with
strangers was not extraordinary, and therefore does not warrant a downward
departure in sentencing), with United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir.
1991) (upholding downward departure for a single mother of a two month old and
a sixteen year old daughter who also cared for the daughter's infant child).
148. See Raeder, supra note 147, at 741-42 (describing the way in which courts
have interpreted sentencing guidelines with regard to an abuser's coercion of a
woman offender).
149. See Lisa Maher & Richard Curtis, Women on the Edge of Crime: Crack
Cocaine and the Changing Contexts of Street-Level Sex Work in New York City,
in Criminology at the Crossroads: Feminist Readings in Crime and Justice
(Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998) 110, 110 ("The expanded interface
between the criminal law and women's lives afforded by the 'War on drugs' has
been accompanied by increased administrative regulation which, in labeling these
women 'unfit mothers,' has sought to remove their children, their welfare and
Medicaid benefits and their housing-usually in that order.").
150. Welfare reform legislation adopted in many states renders someone with a
felony drug conviction permanently disqualified from receiving Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) funds. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1994)
(requiring states to opt out of the drug conviction restriction). Twenty-two states
retain the ban. See Amy E. Hirsch, 'The World Was Never a Safe Place for
Them": Abuse, Welfare Reform, and Women with Drug Convictions, 7 Violence
Against Women 159, 159 (2001).
151. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994) (financial aid eligibility is temporarily
suspended for the first offense of possession of a controlled substance and for the
first offense of sale of a controlled substance. The third possession or the second
sale offense results in indefinite suspension. However, eligibility may be restored
if the student completes a drug rehabilitation program that complies with certain
criteria.).
152. See Debra S. Kalmus & Murray A. Strauss, Wife's Marital Dependency
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Women's Access to Material Resources Shapes Their
Experiences with CriminalInterventions

Rather than the result of batterer intimidation or
persuasion, women's cooperation with mandatory policies,
particularly with prosecution, is often a product of their
access to material resources and the quality of their
interactions with actors in the criminal justice system." 3
Cooperation with prosecution often requires women to take
time off from work, to acquire transportation and childcare,
or to make other sometimes costly and difficult
arrangements. 154 Thus, women who have family or friends

who will watch the children, help them with chores, or
provide transportation or emergency loans, are more likely
to cooperate with prosecution than women who do not have
access to these informal sources of tangible support. 5 5 As I

discussed previously in this article, women's lack of access
to material resources can make them more vulnerable to
battering.156 Criminal interventions coupled with assistance
and Wife Abuse, 44 J. Marriage & Farn. 277, 280 (1982) (finding objective marital
dependency, as measured by wives' unemployment, presence in home of children
under five years of age, and whether husband earned 75% or more of couple's
income, was correlated with more severe abuse); Jody Raphael, Domestic Violence
and Welfare Receipt: The Unexplored Barrier to Employment, 3 Geo. J. Fighting
Poverty 29, 30-31 (1995) (describing the manner in which women receiving
welfare must rely on male partners, some of whom are controlling and abusive
and sabotage women's attempts at economic self-sufficiency).
153. See Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Justice System, in Do Arrests
and Restraining Orders Work?, supra note 23, at 98 (describing the many reasons
that battered women may decide not to cooperate with prosecution).
154. Id.
155. Goodman et al., supra note 31, at 437 (1999) (finding that women who had
family or friends who could assist them with childcare, transportation, emergency
loans, and help with other chores, were more likely to cooperate with prosecution
than were women who did not have these informal sources of tangible support).
The researchers found no significant relationship between women's cooperation
with prosecution and the levels of emotional support available to victims, the
level of institutional supports available, or the women's levels of depression or
emotional dependence on the batterer. Id. at 440; see also Naomi Cahn, Policing
Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DePaul L.
Rev. 817, 828 (2000) ("[blecause criminalization does not address the emotional or
financial obstacles faced by battered women, criminalization alone is
insufficient.").
156. See supra note 72 and text accompanying. The importance of material
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directed at alleviating the sources of women's vulnerability
are likely to be more effective. Without this assistance,
mandatory policies are likely to be harmful.
Feminist law reformers seek to recognize and oppose
the power of batterers to control and harm women.
Feminist proponents of mandatory policies recognize the
coercive control exercised by battering men and the way in
which that control pervades every aspect of women's
lives. 15 7 The challenge for feminist law making is to give
simultaneous attention to the coercive power of the state.
The state's power is shaped by women's structural
inequalities and by pervasive ideologies that normalize
state intervention in the lives of poor women.
III. CONTROLLING THE STATE: THE ORGANIZING DILEMMA

[We have moved beyond simple rejection of the state or a
simple assumption that the state can solve the problem [of

domestic violence.]

So should we move beyond uncritical

engagement with the state, particularly in the criminal
context, and toward more critical theoretical and practical
analysis?"

In this section, I examine the concern that the absence
of mandatory policies will result in a return to police and

and social resources is apparent in one of the stories Hanna relates in support of
no-drop prosecution policies. Hanna describes the circumstances of a woman
suffering from AIDS. See Hanna, supra note 20, at 1874. The woman objected to
prosecution of her abusive partner because she did not want to lose her only ally,
even though he beat her. Id. Hanna agreed to drop charges, but seems to believe
that that this was a mistake. Id. It is not clear that this woman would have been
better served if Hanna had refused to drop the charges, but it does seem clear
that a referral to services and support groups for persons with AIDS or assistance
with material resources might have made a difference in this woman's
victimization.
157. See Stark, supra note 23, at 121 (describing the manner in which
supports for male authority... merge with the batterer's pattern of control"
giving "a particular man far more power in the eyes of his mate than an outsider
without expert knowledge of the situation can perceive.").
158. Schneider, supra note 3, at 198.
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prosecutor practices that ignore domestic violence cases. 19
As Evan Stark argues, while "it is hard to predict whether
one's welfare will be helped or hindered in any given
encounter [with the police]," 60 the political action that
surrounds the adoption of mandatory arrest policies
"alter[s] the odds favoring a positive [police] response to
male violence." 6 1 The enactment of mandatory policies,

particularly mandatory arrest, may be a particularly wellsuited goal for feminist organizing. Mandatory arrest
provides a bright-line standard for police behavior, which
makes it easier for battered women's advocates to hold
police accountable when they fail adequately to protect
battered women.162 Additionally, mandatory policies that

are the result of feminist activism may result in
agreements that place battered women's advocates within
the courts and police stations on a regular basis, 16' thus
providing an ongoing institutional voice for the concerns of
battered women.
The concern that the absence of mandatory policies
will result in further police minimization or maltreatment
is well grounded. The most common complaint of battered
women regarding police response is that the police do not
159. For example, in response to Mills's rejection of mandatory policies, Stark
writes:
Mills insists she does not favor returning to the discretionary policies of the
past. But what other consequence could result if mandated arrest and
aggressive prosecution were eliminated? ... I am not yet ready to trust the
system to support the values Mills and I share without the administrative
accountability that policy directives provide.
Evan Stark, Mandated State Interventions: Evan Stark's Response, 6 Domestic
Violence Rep. 1, 15 (2000).
160. See Stark, supra note 23, at 117.
161. Id.
162. Id. Cf. Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic
Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 33, 82 (2000) (whether or not repeal of
mandatory arrest rules would result in failure of police to take domestic violence
seriously is an empirical question, but given current changes in police behavior,
this outcome is unlikely).
163. Stark, supra note 23, at 128 (the work to control police response "provides
a rationale for a regular shelter presence in the courts, and lays an empirical
basis that shelters can exploit for custodial orders, orders of protection, and
expanded services.").
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do enough.'6
Women complain that unless they are
seriously injured, police underestimate their danger and
treat them with disrespect. 165 In fact, the strongest negative
ratings of victim satisfaction with police response often
come from those women who desired a harsher response.'66
One study finds that these victims are the least likely to
call the police for subsequent violent incidents.
Ensuring that the state responds to battered women is
critical, but it is not clear that mandatory policies are the
only or best manner in which to control police and
prosecution response. First, policy alternatives need not be
confined to a choice between mandates to arrest and
prosecute, on the one hand, and unfettered official
discretion, on the other. Nor is it necessarily true that
police options are limited to arrest/not arrest or that
prosecutor choices are limited to prosecute/not prosecute.
In fact, current "soft" no-drop prosecution policies suggest
the possibilities of more flexible standards.' 68 Soft no-drop

policies allow victims to choose to drop charges under
certain specified conditions, such as watching a domestic
violence video, speaking to a domestic violence counselor,
or appearing before a judge to explain their reasons for
6 9 Police response can also be more flexible, while
dropping."
164. See, e.g., New York Evaluation of Mandatory Arrest Provisions, supra
note 123, at 61 (victims who were dissatisfied with police response felt that they
"were not treated with respect, that the police refused to investigate the crime
and that the crimes were undercharged given the gravity of the conduct and the
risks posed to the victims.").

165. Id.
166. See Buzawa et al., supra note 56, at 266 (finding that all five victims who
expressed dissatisfaction with police response wanted more aggressive response).
167. Id.
168. See Hanna, supra note 20, at 1863 (describing "hard" and "soft' no-drop
policies). A number of feminist activists argue for placing victim protection ahead
of prosecution policy; see also Hart, supra note 153, at 110 ("[iun those instances
where termination of the prosecution is critical to protect victims, the public
posture should not preclude such prosecutorial discretion.").
169. Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 853, 86062 (1994) (in some jurisdictions a special domestic violence unit composed of the
chief prosecutor, paralegals, and victim advocates must approve any dismissal of
charges; in other jurisdictions, the victim may drop charges only in certain
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still incorporating a standard for police conduct. For
example, Lawrence Sherman proposes that police be
subject to "mandatory action" policies that require that
they choose from a list of options including:
offering to transport the victim to a shelter, taking the
suspect or victim to a detoxification treatment center,
allowing the victim to decide if an immediate arrest should
be made, [and] mobilizing the victim's social networks to
provide short-term protection. "o
A second difficulty with reliance on mandatory policies
to ensure police and prosecutorial response is that the
effectiveness of these policies depends, in large part, on the
existence of an effective battered women's organization.
But mandatory policies are sometimes adopted for reasons
unrelated to feminist organizing, such as the desire to
appease "tough on crime" constituencies while also
currying favor with female voters, 7 ' or the desire to be
circumstances, for example where the accused has no prior convictions; others
require that the victim be advised that her risk of victimization is increased if she
drops charges, that she attend a support group, or that she watch a video on
domestic violence before being allowed to drop charges).
170. Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and
Dilemmas 255-56 (1992). A number of scholars have argued for modified police
discretion, which would require arrest only under certain conditions. See, e.g.,
Peter Margulies, Surviving the State: Transition, Discretion, and Membership in
Domestic Violence Law (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 48-53, on file with
author). Margulies argues that if any of the following are true of the abuser,
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration are justified, even if the victim objects: a
history of significant violence towards third parties as well as intimates;
commission of severe violence; commission of chronic violence. However, if the
victim believes that arrest will increase her danger, police should not arrest
unless they have enough evidence, absent her testimony, to have a realistic
chance of conviction and incarceration. Id.; see also Winick, supra note 162, at
80-84 (arguing for a presumptive arrest policy which allows officers to take

victim's desires as well as the risk of batterer recidivism into consideration in
determining whether to arrest); Buzawa et al., supra note 56, at 25-26
(recommending that with low risk, first time, or "multi-year latency" batterers,
the victim's preference regarding arrest and prosecution should control, while
high risk batterers should be arrested and subject to "long term, strictly
supervised periods of probation and escalating penalties" for repeat offenses and
violations of restraining orders).
171. See Sparks, supra note 1, at 44 ("Merely adopting a pro-arrest policy alone
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eligible for federal funds that require that state grantees
adopt a pro-arrest policy.172
A number of battered women's advocates believe that
mandatory policies should be adopted only when the
policies are a part of a "coordinated community response"
that includes significant advocacy and services for battered

women. 173 Melanie Shepard, for example, argues that the

following essential services for battered women must be in
place before engaging in "institutional reform": emergency
housing, legal advocacy, support groups for battered
women, and financial resources for battered women. 17 4
"[Without... [these] essential services, battered women
may be placed in greater danger when the criminal justice
1 75
system responds to the offender's violence."

Even the availability of services for battered women
may not be adequate to ensure that advocates engage in
ongoing monitoring of the criminal justice system.
Battered women's advocates should be "the stewards of [the
service and legal] infrastructure as they direct, guide, and
support battered women while confronting and challenging
obstacles to their safety.' 76 Many advocacy programs are
simply not prepared to take on this monitoring role. 7 7 Yet,
may signal a primary focus on law enforcement, rather than community
involvement and empowerment for battered women, as the 'solution' to domestic
violence.").
172. See supra note 35 (describing federal funding mandates).
173. See, e.g., Melanie F. Shepard, Advocacy for Battered Women: Implications
for a Coordinated Community Response, in Coordinating Community Responses
to Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond, supra note 85, at 115
("[clommunity intervention projects that focus on institutional reform should not
be initiated without an infrastructure of community services in place to provide
support to battered women").
174. Id.
175. Id. at 116.
176. Shepard, supra note 173, at 115; see also Denise Gamache & Mary Asmus,
Enhancing Networking Among Service Providers: Elements of Successful
Coordination Strategies, in Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic
Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond, supra note 85, at 65, 79 (emphasizing
the prominent role of women's advocates in ensuring that a "coordinated
community response" program assists battered women).
177. Gamache & Asmus, supra note 176, at 79 ("not all advocacy programs...
are prepared to assume the key role that is necessary for coordination to be
effective.").
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the availability of such advocacy may be a critical
determinant in the quality of battered women's experiences
with mandatory policies. Advocates act in two important
roles: as institutional reformers-monitoring police,
prosecutor, and judicial responses to domestic violence;
and, as advocates for individual women. 17

They often act

to soften the effects of mandatory policies when those
policies threaten to harm individual women. As one
advocate notes, "[tihe criminal justice process does not
always effectively address the individual needs of women
and does not work well for many[,]" thus, advocates
frequently find themselves "hav[ing] argued for policy
reforms (e.g., prosecution of cases) only to turn around and
ask for exceptions for individual battered women." 79
If battered women's advocates are to play such a
critical role in the implementation of mandatory policies,
they must adequately represent the range of interests of
women who are battered. The existence of a local battered
women's organization does not necessarily insure this will
be the case. This is true for several reasons. First,
domestic violence service providers do not necessarily share
a unified vision of their work. Mental health professionals
who are trained to focus on individual behavioral changes,
178. These dual roles can create some tension. See, e.g., id. at 120. An
advocate states:
The uncomfortable part is that I am caught betveen advocating for women
and being part of a system. That's the difficult part for me because I'm
doing both things at the same time. I'm on call to keep me focused on the
women, yet I work for an agency that creates and helps to change the
institutional practices.
Id.
179. Shepard, supra note 173, at 120 (quoting an battered women's advocate).
Hanna argues that this dual position is untenable: "One difficulty of discussing
mandated participation within a feminist framework is that we are often left in
the untenable position of arguing that the state should only intervene in women's
lives when it is 'good' for them and stay out when it is 'bad."); Hanna, supra note
20, at 1872. Hanna understands this dual position as representative of "mixed
messages" because the advocacy community wants prosecutors to take domestic
violence cases seriously, "[but] they are unwilling to acknowledge the practical
dilemmas posed when a jurisdiction pursues an aggressive strategy." Cheryl
Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence,
39 Wn.& Mary L. Rev. 1505, 1552 (1998).
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rather than on community activism and political change
may operate battered women's services. s0
Further,
domestic violence interventions are frequently the result of
compromises between the competing goals of stakeholder

organizations and professionals, each of whom brings a
somewhat different agenda and different understanding of
the dynamics of domestic violence. 181
In addition, a local battered women's organization may
not be representative of all battered women if the interests
of women of color, ethnic minorities, and other
marginalized women are not well represented. 8 2 Shelters
180. See Schechter, supra note 6, at 106-07 (professionals working with
battered women minimized the need for advocacy and social change and often
reject a feminist analysis of battering).
181. In some locales, the funding structure exacerbates these tensions. For
example, state funds for battered women's shelters in Florida are funneled
through the Department of Children and Families, the same department that
responds to charges of child dependency and neglect. Since battered mothers are
sometimes accused of child abuse, including "failing" to prevent child abuse
committed by their violent partner or failing to prevent their children's exposure
to their own abuse, see discussion supra pages 833-37, a tension exists between
the mission of shelters to empower battered women and that of child protection
workers. The Florida funding arrangement thus compromises the shelter's ability
to advocate for battered women who are the subject of child abuse and neglect
investigations. See generally interview with Dougan, supra note 124.
182. See, e.g., Jenny Rivera, Intimate Partner Violence Strategies: Models for
Community Participation, 50 Me. L. Rev. 283, 295 (1998) ("Communities with
disparately less power in the larger social structure are disparately represented
in the coalition [against domestic violence]...."); Gloria Valencia-Weber &
Christine P. Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of Indigenous Women
in the United States, St. John's L. Rev. 69, 130 (1995) ("Indian women and other
women of color confront the same cultural insensitivity and racism at urban
domestic violence shelters as they do elsewhere. These shelters can be unaware of
the cultural resources which should be used to assist Indian victims of domestic
violence."); Crenshaw, supra note 37, at 1262-65 (1991) (describing way in which
shelters for battered women fail to meet needs of women of color); Zanita E.
Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in
Gender Violence, 8 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 11 (1998) (describing manner in
which racial and gender based stereotypes interact in stereotypes of women's
victimization); Beverly Horsburgh, Schrdegreesodinger's Cat, Eugenics, and the
Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New
Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income
Women of Color, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 531, 577 (1996) ("Strategies [against
domestic violencel ... are inclined to reflect the experiences of white women" and
"seldom deal with the economic and workplace discrimination issues that best
women of color."); Kimberly A. Huisman, Wife Battering in Asian American
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and advocacy programs often operate with all-white or
nearly all-white staff.'83 Battered
women's
service
organizations are often unaware of, and do not meet, the
particular needs of women of color. 184
A coordinated community response offers a balance
between the need to create a system for controlling the
state (for battered women's benefit) while protecting
individual women. That balance requires a particular kind
of advocacy infrastructure, however.
Such an
infrastructure consists of significant services for battered

women as well as savvy, institutionally integrated-yet
independently minded and funded-advocates for women.
These advocates must simultaneously urge state actors to
follow the (mandatory) rules-e.g., arrest and prosecuteand argue for exceptions to those rules when a woman is
endangered by them. It is a tribute to the tenacity and
creativity of the battered women's movement that this is

happening anywhere-and it is!8 5

But this kind of

independent advocacy does not represent the state of
Communities, 2 Violence Against Women 260, 267 (1996) (noting that services for
battered women frequently do not have workers who are linguistically and
culturally competent to assist Asian American battered women, particularly
recent immigrant women); Rivera, supra note 29, at 253 (noting that shelters
sometimes refuse admission to monolingual Spanish speakers and few shelters
have bilingual and bicultural staff); Valli Kanuha, Domestic Violence, Racism,
and the Battered Women's Movement in the United States, in Future
Interventions with Battered Women and Their Families 34, 45 (Edleson &
Eisikovits eds., 1996) (arguing that the battered women's movement has failed to
represent battered women who are "most at the margins," including women of
color and discussing situation of native Hawaiian women, in particular).
183. See Denise A. Donnelly et al., Provision and Exclusion: The Dual Face of
Services to Battered Women in Three Deep South States, 5 Violence Against
Women 710, 722-25 (1999) (interviews with executive directors of forty-four
agencies for battered women found that women of color were frequently
underserved and some shelter directors offered racial stereotypes as explanations
for the low numbers of women of color shelter residents); Rivera, supra note 29, at
295 ("Communities with disparately less power in the larger social structure are
disparately represented in the coalition [against domestic violence] ...
184. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 182.
185. See Ellen L. Pence & Melanie F. Shepard, An Introduction: Developing a
Coordinated Community Response, in Coordinating Community Responses to
Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond, supra note 85 (describing
the program in Duluth, Minnesota which has served as a model for programs
throughout the U.S., as well as other countries).
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affairs in many areas. '
Thus, feminist law reformers are faced with a
dilemma. Mandatory policies can provide some measure of
control over police and prosecutorial response, but such
policies may also increase the state's control of women.
This risk of increased state control is particularly true for
those women who are otherwise most vulnerable to state
control: poor women, particularly poor women of color, and
women who are engaged in minor crimes, many of which
are directly related to battering. The ability of mandatory
policies to control state action is related to the political
strength of the battered women's movement in a given
locale and the available services for battered women, but
mandatory policies are implemented in jurisdictions with
weak or non-existent advocacy communities. Activists who
support mandatory policies frequently presume that
battered women's advocates will play an ongoing
monitoring role and will mediate the effects of mandatory
policies in circumstances where women are endangered, yet
there is no guarantee that such advocacy is available or
that the advocacy community will adequately represent the
interests of all women.
IV. CONTROLLING THE MESSAGE: THE DILEMMA OF

EXPRESSING SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL
Perhaps the most common argument for mandatory
policies is that they "send a message" of intolerance for
domestic violence. 187 The message argument captures two
186. It may be particularly difficult to create such systems in large
metropolitan areas. See Robyn Holder, Pick 'N Mix or Replication: The Politics
and Process of Adaptation, in Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic
Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond, supra note 85, at 255, 269
(questioning whether the model from the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project of
Duluth, Minnesota, which has served as a model for coordinated community
response programs in England, New Zealand, and Australia, is adaptable to large
metropolitan areas such as London).
187. See, e.g., Hoctor, note 84, at 659 (1997) ("[arrest] communicates... that
domestic violence is a crime"; "[the failure to arrest] tells the parties and others
that domestic violence is a private matter and is acceptable."); Marion Wanless,
Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But is it
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distinct

impulses

regarding

criminal

intervention

in

domestic violence cases. The first is what Jean Hampton
and other retributivists refer to as the "expressive"
justification for criminal law.188 Hampton argues that
when someone commits an act of violence, the perpetrator's
behavior expresses a belief in his right to subordinate the
victim. 189 The message of the offender's act is that the
victim is of less worth than the offender.190 Hampton
argues that criminal law should reverse this message.'
Punishing the offender expresses both the victim's worth
and society's moral outrage at the perpetrator's misuse of
the victim.92

The second argument that strong criminalizing policies
"send a message" relates to the importance of emphasizing
domestic violence as a public and structural problem,
rather than a private and individual problem.' 93 Criminal
Enough?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 533, 554 (1996) ("By enacting mandatory arrest laws
states send a strong message that domestic abuse will not be tolerated.
Mandatory arrest signals that domestic violence is a crime with attendant
consequences."). Hanna, supra note 20, at 1889-1900 ("by penalizing criminal
conduct, the criminal justice system communicates strong educational and social
messages ....One of the most important ways to curb domestic violence is to
ensure that abusers understand that society will not tolerate their behavior.");
Corsilles, supra note 169, at 874 (no-drop prosecution policies send a message to
the victim that "convey[s] ...society's assessment of the pains inflicted on her[,]"
and a message to batterers "that their behavior is no longer tolerated by the state
and is punishable by law.").
188. See Jean Hampton, Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A
Case Study in the Expressive Meaning of Law, 11 Can. J. of L. & Jurisprudence
23 (1998).
189. Id. at 31 ("violence [against women] expresses" and helps to realize "the
view that men are entitled to dominate over women.").
190. Id. at 38 ("The actions which we make criminal offenses are ones that
diminish the value or dignity of the victims, either through the harm committed,
or because of the nature of the action itself.").
191. Id. at 39 ("It is because these [criminal] acts 'say' something that
diminishes the victims' value that we wish to inflict punishment that says
something in return in order to insist on the victim's true (equal) value, and deny
the wrong-doer's claim to elevation.").
192. Id. The expressive argument is built on the recognition that violence is a
"tool of oppression" of women and that failure to "express any kind of
condemnation of the criminal's conduct [leaves] that conduct, and its meaning,
unchallenged." Id. at 36.
193. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in The Public
Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse, supra note 77, at

20011

851

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW

justice system responses to domestic violence may help to
change the common belief that domestic violence is a
problem of individuals and therefore of little consequence
to the larger society. Concepts of family privacy result in

batterers

immunizing

from

public

scrutiny

and

19 4

The reluctance of police, prosecutors, and
intervention.
judges to intervene in domestic violence cases can be
understood as a vestige of coverture in which husbands
were given the authority to govern their wives and
Criminal punishment counters these
children. 195
conceptions of privacy by marking the violence as serious
and of public concern and by "send[ing] a clear social
message that battering is impermissible .... "196
36, 43 ("The concept of privacy encourages, reinforces, and supports violence
against women. Privacy says that violence against women is immune from
sanction, that it is permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of American
family life."); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language, and Family Violence, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1665, 1671 ("Society is
organized to permit violence in the home .... [because] [s]ociety permits such
violence to go unchallenged through the isolation of families and the failure of
police to respond.").
194. See Schneider, supra note 193.
195. See Isabel Marcus, Reframing 'Domestic Violence': Terrorism in the Home,
in The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse, supra
note 77, at 11 (arguing that coverture remains through the tolerance of domestic
violence); Zanita E. Fenton, Mirrored Silence: Reflections on Judicial Complicity
in Private Violence, 78 Or. L. Rev. 995 (1999).
196. See Schneider, supra note 193, at 43. As I argue elsewhere, the feminist
critique that explains state reluctance to intervene in domestic violence cases as
the product of patriarchal notions of family privacy is an important but
inadequate description of the relationship between families and the state. See
supra note 23, at 7-8. Race and class mark the history of that relationship and
affect the quality of "privacy" that families enjoy. As Riva Siegal's history of U.S.
domestic violence law demonstrates, notions of family privacy eventually gave
way to class- and race-based notions of white middle-class superiority. By the end
of the nineteenth century harsh penalties such as whipping were proposed for
wife beaters who were characterized as "lawless or unruly men of the 'dangerous
classes.'" See Reva B. Siegel, 'The Rule of Love': Wife-Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2137-39 (1996). These "dangerous classes" referred
primarily to African American and low-status immigrant men. Id. The massive
removal of Indigenous children by the governments of Australia, the U.S., and
Canada eloquently demonstrates the way in which an ideal of family privacy has
little relevance for the description of relations between the state and families in
subordinated communities. See generally Marlee Kline, Child Welfare Law, "Best
Interests of the Child" Ideology, and First Nations, 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 375
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In addition to countering the batterer's message of
dominance and devaluation of the victim, mandatory
policies may also send a message that counters more
general devaluation of victims. Class, race, and ethnicity
inform the manner in which a victim is determined
"worthy." 197 Dorothy Roberts demonstrates, for example,
that much of U.S. law with regard to procreation reflects a
devaluation of Black women, as individuals, and a
devaluation of their social roles as mothers. 9 " Women who
defy gender norms, women who are "bad" or "deviant," are
also treated as less worthy by criminal justice system
actors. 199
The devaluation of poor people of color is apparent in
the twin problems of aggressive policing and under-policing
that plague poor minority neighborhoods. 00 Hyper(1992) (describing the removal of First Nations children by the Canadian
government); Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia,
Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (1997)
(describing the removal of Aboriginal children by the Australian government);
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 et seq. (2000) (legislation to
correct the removal of Native American children by U.S. government).
197. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987) (defendant relied on a
study (the Baldus study) of 2,000 murder cases in Georgia finding that "after
taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged
with killing blacks."). The current language of crime control-referring to "urban
jungles," and references to the animalistic qualities of criminals, reflects a
devaluation of the lives of those deemed "criminal." Further, this imagery is often
explicitly racist, thus simultaneously devaluing the lives of African Americans
and all of those convicted of crimes. See Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence,
Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 Stan. L .Rev. 777, 800 (2000).
198. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race,
Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (1997).
199. See Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Legal Response to Woman Battering in the
United States, in Women Policing, and Male Violence International Perspectives
155 (Jalna Hanmer et al. eds., 1989) (stating that police respond differently to
"deviants" than to "normals" and often see poor women and intoxicated women as
former); see generally Michelle S. Jacobs, Prostitutes, Drug Users, and Thieves:
The Invisible Women in the Campaign to End Violence Against Women, 8 Temp.
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 459 (1998) (criticizing the failure of feminist theorists to
examine violence in the lives of women who engage in prostitution, drug user, and
other criminal behavior, in part because of feminist theory reliance on the trope of
the "good" victim).
200. See Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J.
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aggressive policing is partially to blame for the
disproportionate numbers of African American, Latino, and
indigenous men in prison.2 0 1 Devaluation of African
American women, Latinas, and indigenous women is
apparent in the police failure to respond to domestic
violence calls from these women. 2
Mandatory policies
which require police to respond and to arrest may counter
the message of devaluation of poor women of color.
The difficulty with the expressive argument, however,
is that law enforcement interventions carry a set of social
meanings that are often contradictory, highly contextual,
and related as much or more to police attitudes and
policing processes 203 than to the substance of statutes or the
operation of courts. Criminal justice intervention will have
different meanings for men and women who are members
of communities subordinated by race, class, or ethnicity.
Gender Race & Just. 1, 20-21 (1997) (historically the problem with policing in

"poverty-stricken African American communities" was one of police disinterest in
black-on-black crime; currently, "poor policing frequently takes the form of
indiscriminate, violent, and racist intrusions ...provoking fear, resentment, and
contempt among the population ostensibly to be protected.").
201. Much of this is the result of "war on drugs" policing. See Tracey L.
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
191, 213 (1998) ("the racial asymmetry in drug incarcerations... is the inevitable
consequence of the current drug law enforcement strategy."). The incarceration
rates of African American men have increased dramatically as a result of drug
policy, see generally Tonry, supra note 146, as have the incarceration rates of
African American women, see Bush-Baskette, supra note 145.
202. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 29, at 247 ("There may be a sense among
police officers that violent behavior is commonplace and acceptable within the
Latino community, and that both men and women expect Latinos to react
physically in situations of domestic conflict."); Linda L. Ammons, Mules,
Madonna's, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The AfricanAmerican Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1003,
1018 ("Black women.., must overcome the [police] presumption that their race
predisposes them to engage in and enjoy violence.").
203. See Julie Stubbs, 'Communitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against
Women: A Cautionary Note, in Wife Assault and the Canadian Criminal Justice
System: Issues and Policies (Mariana Valverde et al. eds., 1995) 260, 262 ("The
outcome of policing, and of criminal justice intervention more generally is likely to
be varied, perhaps contradictory, and in part determined by context"); Raymond
Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on
Spouse Assault, 31 Law & Soc'y Rev. 163 (1997) (a belief in procedural fairnesse.g., that they were treated fairly by the police-had an inhibiting effect on
recidivism for men arrested for domestic violence).
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This is true both in symbolic terms, of the nature Hampton
identifies, as well as in concrete terms.
Evidence suggests that men of color are arrested for
domestic violence in disproportionate numbers,204 but even
if that were not the case, arrest may have
disproportionately negative effects and carry a
disproportionately negative meaning for men of color and
indigenous men. These negative effects may increase the
likelihood of batterer recidivism.
Disproportionately
negative effects for men of color and indigenous men occur
in at least three ways. First, many men of color are more
likely to experience harsher treatment for a domestic
violence misdemeanor arrest because they are more likely
to have a record of prior arrests.20 5 This is the result, in

part, of discriminatory police enforcement and the
surveillance and crime control behavior of many urban
police forces.20 6 The result is that these men are less likely
to be eligible for diversion or probation and more likely to
204. See discussion, supra notes 31, 32 and text accompanying.
205. See Jerome G. Miller, From Social Safety Net to Dragnet: African
American Males in the Criminal Justice System, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 479,
487-88 (1994) (citing 1990 research by the Sentencing Project that finds that "on
an average day in the United States, one of every four African American men age
twenty to twenty-nine was either in prison or jail or on probation or on parole";
contrary to stereotype, most of the charges brought against young African
American men are for non-violent crimes); see also Lawrence A. Greenfeld &
Steven K, Smith, U.S. Dep't of Justice, American Indians and Crime 26 (1999)
(over 4% of the American Indian population is under correctional control,
compared to 2% of white adults, 9.8% of African American adults, and less than
0.5% of Asian adults; American Indians under correctional control are much more
likely to be incarcerated (46%), than are others who are under correctional
control).
206. See generally Meares, supra note 201, at 213 (describing the harmful
effects on poor minority communities of "get tough" policing policies); Tonry,
supra note 146 (the "war on drugs" led to "a tactical focus on disadvantaged
minority neighborhoods" where arrests were easier to make and where trade in
the drugs primarily targeted by the War--cocaine and crack-was readily
apparent.). Increasingly, a conviction for domestic violence can result in what
Peter Margulies refers to as "sanctioning cascades" in which mandatory arrest
and prosecution trigger secondary enforcement measures such as immigration
law provisions that make domestic violence conviction a grounds for deportation
or requirements of notification to employers. See Margulies, supra note 170, at
45; see also Coker, supra note 14, at 1016 (describing the harmful effects of such
policies as employer notification).

20011

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW

855

receive enhanced sentences for repeat offenders.0 7 Second,
a batterer's prior history with law enforcement is likely to
effect the meaning he derives from a domestic violence
arrest. If the arrest marks yet "another stigmatic
encounter with the justice system,"2 8 the arrest may
convey disrespect for him, rather than convey respect for
the victim.
The third way in which mandatory policies may have
disproportionately negative meanings for men of color and
indigenous men regards the manner in which marginalized
men and police sometimes construct masculinities. When
men batter their female partner, it is often a means of
reasserting control and dominance. 2 9 "[Mien use violence

or the threat of violence as an affirmative way of proving
individual or collective masculinity, or in desperation when
they perceive their masculine self-identity to be under
attack."2 10 Angela Harris describes the manner in which
"[mien denied access to [the dominant form of masculinity
in America]-because they are working class and take
orders rather than give them, or because they lack the
education and training to exhibit technological prowessoften resort to 'hypermasculinity' (the exaggerated
exhibition of physical strength and personal aggression) in
an attempt to gain social status."21 1

"Hypermasculinity"

may characterize both the response of police officers as well
as that of "offenders"2' 12 resulting in a "mutually
207. Domestic violence diversion is usually available only for those with no
criminal record and the diversion requires completion of a batterer's treatment
program and no further arrest. See, e.g., Linda Dakis & Lauren Lazarus,
Attacking the Crime of Domestic Violence: How Dade County is Protecting the
Victim and Punishing the Perpetrator, 19-SPG Fain. Advoc. 46, 49 (1997).
208. John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and
Communitarian Control, in Just Boys Doing Business? Men, Masculinities, and
Crime 189, 199 (Tim Newburn & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1994) (describing a
pyramid of increasing sanctions against batterers, including community
conferencing).
209. See Coker, supra note 99, at 40 ("Batterers ... use the political and
economic vulnerability of women to reinforce their power and dominance over
particular women.").
210. Harris, supra note 197, at 781.

211. Id. at 784.
212. Id. at 793.
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antagonistic yet interdependent relationship .... fulnited
in a kind of masculine community."2 3 When police
intervention reenacts a masculine display-violence met
with violence-it is unlikely to curb battering. This
suggests that the message of mandatory policies sometimes
has little to do with expressing the moral worth of the
victim and more to do with expressing state control over
men in subordinated communities.
The meaning that batterers attach to mandatory
policies may be an important variable in the likelihood that
they will continue their violence. Sherman's findings that
arrest had an escalating effect on the violence of
unemployed men 214-- that is, unemployed men arrested for
domestic violence were more likely to commit further acts
of violence then were unemployed men who were warned
and not arrested-may be explained by the different
meanings that criminal justice intervention holds for
offenders.
Elizabeth Marciniak's review of NIJ arrest
25
in Milwaukee suggests such a possibility.
data
study
Marciniak found that residence in the most marginalized
neighborhoods was a stronger predictor of increased
violence following arrest than was the unemployment
status of those arrested.1 6 These findings are consistent
with the work of Tracey Meares.217 Meares demonstrates
that the social disorganization characteristic of some inner
city neighborhoods relates to the level of crime in those
neighborhoods.215 As Meares explains, "the structure of the
community in which an individual lives interacts in
important ways to either facilitate or retard the
213. Id. at 793. Harris is describing members criminal street gangs and police
officers.
214. See Sherman, supra note 42.
215. See Marciniak, supra note 43, at 74 (analyzing Milwaukee data, which
found that arrestees living in census tracts with high levels of female headed
households, families receiving welfare, poverty, high divorce rate, and high
unemployment had higher domestic violence recidivism rates post-arrest).
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Meares, supra note 201, at 213-17; Tracey L. Meares, Charting
Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law
Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev 137 (1997).
218. See generally Meares, supra note 201; Meares, supra note 217.
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individual's criminal.., behavior."219
Mandatory policies may have a disproportionately
negative impact on communities of color, as well as on
individual men who batter. For example, the hypersegregation 220 of many cities means that it is much more
likely that a significant number of African American men
arrested will reside in the same neighborhood than is true
for whites who are arrested. When large numbers of men
are arrested in a given neighborhood, other residents of the
neighborhood may be less likely to believe in the legitimacy
of law enforcement.2 21 The meaning a battered woman's
community attaches to criminal intervention against
domestic violence is likely to affect her own assessment of
the policy and its usefulness. If her community believes
that calling the police for domestic violence is disloyal, 222 for
example, not only may this assessment effect her own
values, but it is likely to reflect the kind of assistance she
will receive from her community if she rejects their
assessment.
In addition, the meaning of mandatory policies for
battered women may depend, in part, on the quality of the
interaction between victims and police officers. Interviews
with battered women find that their satisfaction with police
response often depends on the demeanor of the officers.223
219. Meares, supra note 201, at 191.
220. See Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and
Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203, 1219 (1995) (asserting
that hyper-segregation and rising black poverty creates neighborhoods with
"street orientation," meaning "a social world characterized by high levels of
interpersonal hostility and aggression.").
221. See Meares, supra note 201, at 213-17 (racial asymmetry in drug
incarcerations discourages law-abiding citizens from cooperating with the police
because the policy stigmatizes all African Americans as "criminal" which, in turn,
promotes distrust of law enforcement, and because of the belief in "linked fate.").
222. See Richie, supra note 142, at 62 (describing the ways in which the sense
of racial solidarity for some African American women creates a conflict with their
needs as battered women); Rivera, supra note 29, at 248 ("Latinas face the
precarious, often untenable situation of the 'double bind'- empowerment through
the disempowerment of a male member of the community. The internal conflict
and external pressures to cast police officials as outsiders, hostile to the
community, frustrates the development of the Latinas' empowerment.").
223. See New York Evaluation of Mandatory Arrest Provisions, supra note 123,
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Victims may experience mandatory policies in ways that

affirm their moral worth or in ways that do not.
CONCLUSION
Protecting battered women requires that the criminal
justice system respond when women call. It also requires
policies that allow women to leverage their personal and
public resources, including criminal justice resources, in
their efforts to stop battering.
This requires that battered women have some measure
of control over the deployment of criminal interventions.
But "choice" is not meaningful if women do not have
adequate material resources or if they cannot gain some
protection against the coercion of both the batterer and the
state.
Poor women are subject to a dual vulnerability: the
private coercion224 and violence of abusive men and the
public coercion and violence of the state.2 25 When battered
at 53 (interviews with battered women demonstrates that "[o]ne of the most
powerful factors that seemed to determine victim satisfaction with the police was
the manner in which he police treated the victim."). This is consistent with the
findings of researchers regarding procedural justice. See, e.g., Paternoster et al.,
supra note 203, at 176-82 (reporting lower recidivism for those offenders who
received higher measures of procedural fairness and measuring of procedural
fairness to include not handcuffing the accused, not using physical force in the
arrest, and the police taking the time to listen to both the offender and the
victim); see generally Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of
Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 983,
1000, 1009 (2000) (people are more willing to defer to legal authority when they
perceive that they were treated fairly, but this may be less true for those who
strongly identify with a subgroup).
224. Poor women are also especially vulnerable to the "private" coercion and
violence in their work. See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker
Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 Stan.
L. Rev. 1 (1988) (describing worker mistreatment, most of which is treated by
courts as not severe or outrageous enough to give rise to tort damages).
225. As a result of this dual vulnerability, the benefits of law reform may be
particularly difficult to sustain for poor women. Consider the example of child
custody laws. A number of states have adopted statutory presumptions against
granting custody to a batterer. See supra note 122. The result is to change
dramatically the nature of battered women's bargaining with their spouse at
divorce. However, in adopting these laws, legislatures became convinced of the
harms children suffer as a result of witnessing domestic violence. This, then, has
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women's advocates negotiate with the state,226 the
challenge is to develop strategies that ensure a positive
state response, while limiting the risk that these
interventions will result in increased state control of
women.
How might we diminish the risk that increasing state
intervention against domestic violence will increase state
control of women? First, we must organize for more
material assistance for battered women. Crime control
policies are costly, but lawmakers continue to be willing to
allocate funds for purposes that sound like "fighting crime."
We must begin to articulate that economic justice for
women and children is part of domestic violence
prevention. 227

Bundling services within crime control

programs does not adequately address this need. This is
true both because of the limitations of the programs and
because many battered women do not come to the attention
of the criminal justice system. 28 A focus on economic justice
requires that battered women's advocates work to
strengthen coalitions with activists and organizations that
attend to the broader picture of violence against women in
become a rationale for increased intervention in battered women's lives through
state child protection agencies. See discussion, supra pages 833-37. Poor women
and women of color are far more likely to be the subject of these child abuse and
neglect allegations. Id. I do not believe that feminist efforts to demonstrate the
harms to children of witnessing battering caused this result. Rather, this
increase in state control and surveillance grows from the same "governing
through crime" trend, see Simon, supra note 8, that has engendered efforts to
treat drug use during pregnancy as child abuse, see Roberts, supra note 198, at
150-201, and to respond to social problems such as school truancy with punitive
criminal sanctions against parents, see Simon, supra note 10. The discourse
regarding harms to children from witnessing abuse provides a convenient
rationale for the extension of a well-established trend.
226. See Cynthia Daniels, in Feminists Negotiate the State, supra note 1, at
87 ("In their efforts to protect and empower women... feminists constantly
negotiate the terms for defining, studying, and intervening in domestic violence
as they interact with the many facets of the state and with the public.").
227. Id. at 90 ("Domestic violence policy must also be linked to issues of central
concern to poor communities, including employment and welfare policies and
police and criminal justice issues.").
228. See, e.g., Holder, supra note 186, at 269 (citing research in Australia
finding that few women who experience abuse seek help from the criminal justice
system).
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inner cities and the broader picture of women's economic
status.229
Second, we must recognize that universal policies are
unlikely to be successful. Rather, effective policies must
derive from local struggles and local organizing efforts.
Third, we must explore alternatives to mandatory
policies for establishing control of the state's response to
domestic violence. For example, elsewhere, I suggest the
230
establishment of domestic violence citizen review panels
that would evaluate police response to domestic violence
calls and hear complaints from individuals regarding
inadequate responses. 231
Finally, in developing anti-domestic violence
strategies, we must attend to the coercive power of the
state, as well as the coercive power of battering men.

229. See Naranch, supra note 2, at 93; see also Joan Meier, Domestic Violence,
Character, and Social Change in the Welfare Reform Debate, J.L. & Pol'y, 205,
215, Apr. 1997 (discussing the problems and potential of alliance work between
poverty lawyers and battered women's lawyers); see generally Raphael, supra
note 152.
230. See Coker, supra note 14, at 1051-52.
231. Id. Peter Margulies suggests something similar in which assessment
panels consisting of "representatives from survivors' self-help groups; social
workers; academicians focusing on domestic violence; and representatives of law
enforcement agencies" would listen to presentations from "survivors and
abusers,... arresting officers, prosecutors, and clinicians about common themes
in their experiences." Margulies, supra note 170, at 61.

